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VOLUME 89

JANUARY 1976

NUMBER 3

HARVARD LAW REVIEW
THE METAMORPHOSIS OF LARCENY
George P. Fletcher *
To the modern lawyer, the rules of common law theft offenses do
not seem ordered by any coherent principle. In this Article, however, Professor Fletcher shows that the common law of larceny
can be understood in terms of two structural principles, possessorial
immunity and manifest criminality. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as the modern style of legal thought evolved, first
commentators and then courts lost their ability to understand these
principles and came to rely on intent as the central element of criminal liability. As a result of this transformation,Professor Fletcher
argues, the range of circumstances that can provoke prosecutorial
scrutiny has greatly expanded and the nature of such inquiry has
grown more intrusive. Our interest in privacy, Professor Fletcher
suggests, should lead us to reconsider the system of common law
larceny; if we cannot revive it, we must at least remember the
values, now lost, which were once implicit in it.

T

HE common law of theft strikes most contemporary observ-

ers as a maze of arbitrary distinctions. Virtually all the
academic writing in the field expresses impatience with the distinctions among larceny, embezzlement, larceny by trick, and obtaining property by false pretenses.' Justice Cardozo thought the
@ 1976 by George P. Fletcher.
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. B.A., University
of California at Berkeley, i96o; J.D., University of Chicago, 1964; M. Comp. L.,
University of Chicago, 1965: The process of writing this Article, which is part of
a broader inquiry into the foundations of modern criminal theory, has generated
many hours of enjoyable and provocative discussion with students and colleagues.
I am particularly indebted for comments and encouragement to Gary Bellow,
Alan Dershowitz, John Hart Ely, Morton Horwitz, William McGovern, Herbert
Morris, and Charles Nesson.
Readers not familiar with theft offenses might find it useful to work with
hornbook definitions. Common law larceny is typically defined as the "trespassory
taking and carrying away of the personal property of another with intent to steal
it." W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRimINAL LAw 622 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAvE & SCOTT]; R. PERKINS, CRimiNAL LAW i90 (1957). ,
Since embezzlement is a statutory offense, its elements vary considerably.
Uniting contemporary variations of the crime are (i) an act of acquiring possession or of being entrusted with an object, (2) a subsequent act of deprivation,
usually termed "conversion" or "fraudulent appropriation," and (3) a possible
limitation of the punishment to persons occupying particular statuses, such as
clerks, servants, brokers, agents, etc. The generative English statute, 39 Geo. 3,
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central distinction between larceny and embezzlement failed to
"correspond to an essential difference in the character of the
acts;" 2 the technical rules differentiating these two offenses so
puzzled Holmes that he dismissed them as the product of "historical accidents." 3 The thrust of the law for the last two centuries
has been toward transcendence of these historical "accidents"
and the creation of a unified law of theft offenses.4
c. 85 (i799), was limited to servants and clerks who, having "receive[d] or
take[n] into possession" an itemized list of chattels, "fraudulently embezzle,
secret or make away with the same." The contemporary California statute
covers all persons "fraudulently appropriat~ing] property which has been entrusted to [them]." CAL. PENAL CODE § 484 (West 1970). See generally LAFAvE
& SCOTT, supra at 644-54.
The crime of larceny by trick is a common law variation of larceny. It is
typically thought to date from The King v. Pear, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (1779),
which held Pear guilty of larceny for hiring a horse with fraudulent intent and
subsequently selling it. The elements of the offense are fraudulent acquisition and
subsequent conversion. Yet there is considerable disagreement, whether the conversion is necessary and whether the crime is committed at the time of initial
acquisition or at the time of conversion, compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 484 (West
i97o) (committed at the time of acquisition), with State v. Coombs, 55 Me. 477
(1867) (interpreting Pear as involving a crime committed at the time of conversion).
Obtaining property by false pretenses is a statutory offense, originating in 33
Hen. 8, c. i (154i) and in 3o Geo. 2, c. 24 (1757). It is typically committed by
someone who (1) knowingly (2) makes a material misrepresentation about a
concrete fact and (3) thereby (4) induces the victim to convey title to chattels
or land to the defendant. See generally LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra at 655-7o.
2
Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N.Y. 303, 3o6, 146 N.E.
432, 433 (1925).
' Commonwealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523, 527, 30 N.E. 364, 364 (1892). The
rule in question was that employees who deliver objects received from third
persons into their employer's domain and then take them are guilty of larceny,
while those who take such objects without delivering them to the employer, are
guilty of embezzlement. For discussion of this rule, see pp. 489-90 injra.
'The ongoing English thrust toward legislative reform has been particularly
evident. The comprehensive Theft Act 1968, c. 6o, and the Larceny Act, 19x6,
6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 5o, were preceded by several efforts at formulating a systematic
approach to larceny. See REPORT OF THE CR!ITANAL CODE BILL COMMIuISSION: A
DRAFT CODE OF CRIAIINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1879), discussed in 3 J. STEPHEN,
A HISTORY OF THE CRIMANAL LAW OF ENGLAND 162-68 (1883); First Report from
His Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law, in 26 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY
PAPERS: CRImNAL LAW 37-42 (1934) [hereinafter cited as First Report]. The
twentieth century literature has called incessantly for reform in the direction of
expanding the scope of the offense, eliminating distinctions, and simplifying the
law. See, e.g., Edwards, Possession and Larceny, 3 CURRENT LEGAL PROD. 127
(i950); Goodhart, The Obsolescent Law of Larceny, 16 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
42 (1959); Turner, Larceny and Trespass, 58 L.Q. REV. 340 (1942); Williams,
Reform of the Law of Larceny: An Urgent Task, 21 MOD. L. REV. 43 (1958).
The American literature, in contrast, appears to be oriented more toward historical studies, with a muted interest in legislative reform. See, e.g., J. HALL,
THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1952); Beale, The Borderland of Larceny, 6

X976]

METAMORPHOSIS OF LARCENY

This drive for consistency has generated a continuous expansion of criminal liability for dishonest acquisitions. Embezzlement
has grown from an offense applicable to selected relationships of
trust 5 to a general offense applicable to everyone who has been
entrusted with property,6 and the current tendency is to unite larceny and embezzlement in one overarching offense committed by
anyone "who dishonestly appropriates the property of another." I
False pretenses, which formerly required a verifiable misrepresentation of external fact,8 now includes obtaining property by false
promises as well.' Even the fundamental idea that stealing presupposes the acquisition of a concrete asset, that mere breach of
contract is not enough, is now in question. The draftsmen of
the Model Penal Code maintain that there is no essential difference between misappropriating an entrusted asset and failing to
perform a promise to pay over a sum equivalent to an amount received for that purpose.'" With all these traditional distinctions
in doubt," the impulse toward consistency and expansion of liHARv. L. REV. 244 (1892), Scurlock, The Element of Trespass in Larceny at Colnmon Law, 22 TEMP. L.Q. 12 (1948).
'See 39 Geo. 3, c. 85 (1799) (limited to servants and clerks). Coverage was
later extended to bankers, merchants, brokers, attorneys, and "agents of any
description whatsoever," see 52 Geo. 3, c. 63 (1812), to trustees, see 20 & 21 Vict.,
C. 54 (1857), and to partners stealing or embezzling property.held jointly, see 31
& 32 Vict., C. 116 (1868).

' See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 484 (West 1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 739-1

(1968); IND. AhNN. STAT. § 10-3030 (Burns 1975).
7 Theft Act 1968, c. 6o, § i(l) ("A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly
appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently
depriving the other of it . . . .").

This statute serves as a model for legislative

revision in other Commonwealth countries. See the Crimes (Theft) Act 1973,
1973 Acts of Parliament (Victoria, Austl.) 231 (No. 8425), which came into force
in October, 1974. For a good discussion of problems that have arisen under the
English revision, see Elliott, Three Problems in the Law of Theft, 9 MELn. UNIV.
L. REV. 448 (974).
' See pp. 523-24, note 230.
')MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Theft Act
1968, c. 6o, §§ 15(1), i5(4) ; People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271

(1954).
0

" MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.8

(Proposed Official Draft 1962).

The com-

mentary makes it clear that the draftsmen were skeptical about the distinction
between converting a physical object and breaching an obligation. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2064, Comment, at 81 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).

The rule was

designed to abrogate the result in cases like Commonwealth v. Mitchneck, 130
Pa. Super. 433, 198 A. 463 (1938) (payroll officer, pocketing moneys deducted
from salary checks ostensibly for direct payment of employees' debts, held not
guilty of embezzlement, because he did not have possession of moneys belonging
to employees).
" Another architectonic common law rule in ever-decreasing favor is that
passage of title distinguishes offenses based on fraud from offenses deriving from
larceny (i.e., embezzlement and larceny by trick). The former category pre-
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ability brooks little restraint. The end in sight is the criminalization of all cases of dishonest self-enrichment.
Modern lawyers have obviously lost touch with the style of
thought that underlay the rules and distinctions that crystallized
prior to the end of the eighteenth century. Peering through new
conceptual lenses, nineteenth century lawyers found their tradition to be a jumble of technical rules. What made sense to Coke,
Hale, and Blackstone "2was explained away as historical happenstance or the response to immediate social needs. What we fail to
see today is that the way lawyers looked at larceny prior to the
end of the eighteenth century represented a coherent system of
legal thought. In this paper I shall attempt to explicate that system of thought and show that it expressed a way of looking at
legality and criminal justice that incorporated important substantive values as well as a characteristic style of legal reasoning.
The traditional approach to larceny was built on two structural principles which expressed the distinction between a public
sphere of criminal conduct and a private sphere subject at most to
regulation by the rules of private law. One of these structural
principles, possessorial immunity, was the explicit rule of the
courts that transferring possession of an object conferred immunity from the criminal law on the party receiving possession, for
subsequent misuse or misappropriation of the entrusted object. 13
This rule was fundamental in defining the contours of larceny as
well as the boundary between larceny and the newer offenses that
developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
supposes that one acquired title, or at least a property interest, by way of deception. See Nelson v. United States, 227 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (applying rule
to acquisition subject to a chattel mortgage); People v. Noblett, 244 N.Y. 355,
i55 N.E. 670 (1927) (title to money held to have passed); LAFAYE & Scott, supra
note i, at 66o. If the defendant did not acquire title to the goods or money, the
required charge was larceny by trick rather than false pretenses. See Graham v.
United States, 187 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. ig5o), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (I95x);
The Queen v. Russett, 2 Q.B. 312 (1892). The current legislative pattern is to
acknowledge the difference between theft by appropriation and theft by deception, see Theft Act 1968, c. 6o, §§ i, 16; MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.2, 223.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), but in Great Britain, in particular, the definitions of
both offenses have become so vague that they seem to have consumed each other.
Compare Theft Act 1968, c. 6o, § I ("dishonestly appropriat[ing] property [of]
another"), with id. § i6 (obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception); see
Lawrence v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1971) 3 W.L.R. 225 (H.L.) (offenses
overlap) ; Elliott, supra note 7, at 451-56.
"2See generally E. CoKE, THIRD INSTITUTE *1o7-Io; i M. HALE, HISTORY OF
THE PLEAS OF T3E CROWN 503-17

(1683); 4 W.

BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

*229-50.

3

o R.

GLANVILL, THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE

REALM

o0 ENGLAND *13-14 (G. Hall ed. i965) ("Clearly he is not guilty of theft, because
he initially had possession from the owner of the thing.").
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The second structural principle of the common law was the
implicit rule that criminal liability should attach to all conduct
conforming to a collective image of acting like a thief and only
to such conduct. In its expansive aspect, this principle meant that
acting like a thief created a prima facie case of liability. In its
limiting aspect, the rule meant that objectively unincriminating
conduct was not subject to criminal sanctions. Thus, if the actor's
intent to steal did not manifest itself in an externally identifiable
act of stealing, no larceny could be committed, and, therefore,
alternative proof of the actor's criminal intent would be irrelevant.
The premise of the traditional approach to larceny was that it
was possible to perceive thievery directly as an event in the world
and that the courts should rely on this unanalyzed perception in
framing the law of theft. Modern legal theory rejects unanalyzed
perceptions as a proper source of law. Today we are inclined to
analyze the phenomenon of theft into the twin elements of harm
and intent. The harm is the unlicensed acquisition of another's
property; the intent is defined derivatively as the intent to effect
this harm. The implication of so analyzing the crime of theft is
that no particular conduct is necessary in order to prove the required intent. Intent may be established by a variety of means,
including confessions, admissions, past criminal conduct, and
other circumstantial evidence, all of which presuppose an intrusive and open-ended investigation into the life of the accused.
These two approaches to the law of larceny merit our detailed
attention, for they signal two clashing conceptions of the proper
scope of the criminal law. The traditional approach reflected a
deep commitment to working out the realm of public harms, subject to criminal prosecution, and the realm of private harms,
subject only to redress by means of private actions. The view
that some harms do not meet the threshold of potentially criminal
events remains one of the background assumptions of the legal
system. The private nature of at least some harms is a consequence of the relationship in which they occur. This is reflected in
our taking for granted that cheating in the university should not
be a crime. The principle of possessorial immunity analogously
expressed the privacy of harms that occurred in the context of
relationships in which one party entrusted an object to another.
Further, the limitation of liability to conduct that appeared manifestly to be thievery exempted another set of deprivations from
the scope of the criminal law. These deprivations were private in
the sense that the process of acquisition was not a public or socially disturbing event. Rejecting both possessorial immunity and
the principle of objective criminality, the modern law of theft
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offenses verges on treating every deprivation of property as a
public harm.
It is important to realize that an act of thieving might endanger a range of interests other than wealth. 4 In the traditional
view, the thief upset the social order not only by threatening property, but by violating the general sense of security and well-being
of the community;" in this broader sense, theft was feared as a
socially unnerving event. Similarly, the harm in improper acquisitions by employees, later punished as embezzlement, was traditionally thought to be a breach of trust." Thus, the harm in both
larceny and embezzlement was primarily relational: The thief
endangered the established order of the community; the embezzler breached a particular relationship of confidence with his employer. The transition to the modern conception of theft witnessed
the dissolution of these relational aspects of larceny and embezzlement. Both crimes came to be seen primarily as offenses against
property interests. The modern vision of the criminal law seems
to be that the proper allocation of each item of property enjoys
the full concern of the community; the dishonest displacement of
wealth from one person to another therefore becomes a public
harm. This transition in the concept of harm and in the nature
of theft as a crime lay behind the nineteenth century misunderstanding of the distinctions worked out in the traditional approach
to larceny.
The critical period in the metamorphosis of larceny is the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. We shall later describe
this transition in abundant detail, but first we need to develop the
common law approach to larceny more fully and illustrate how a
proper interpretation of the past can assist us in understanding
the technical rules of the crime.
" In the course of the eighteenth century, the German conception of larceny
shifted in nature from a crime of "breaking possession" to a crime against
property. See H. MAYER, DIE UNTREUE 25-32 (x926). Feuerbach's textbook was
one of the first systematic efforts at classifying larceny as a crime against
property. See A. FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH DES GEMEI.EN IN DEUTSCHLAND OELTENDEN
PEINLicHEN RECHTS §§ 312, 315 (i8oi). Blackstone was apparently the first of the
great common law writers to classify larceny as a crime against property. 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, suipra note 12, at *229.
15 For the implications of this view of criminality, see p. 498 injra.
16 Prior to criminalization of embezzlement, the term "breach of trust" was
used to refer to misappropriations that were subject at most to civil remedies.
See The King v. Pear, i68 Eng. Rep. 208, 209 ('779); cf. The King v. Bazeley,
168 Eng. Rep. 517, 521-22 (1799) (argument by counsel). Though the German
analogue to embezzlement (Unterschlagung) dates back to CoNSTITUTIO CAROLINA
Cn UINALIS § 170 (1532), the crime changed focus in the late eighteenth century;
it shifted from a crime of disloyalty (Untrene) to a crime against property. See
H. MAYER, supra note 14, at 20.
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I.

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO LARCENY

A. PossessorialImmunity
The rule of possessorial immunity meant that those who
acquired possession over chattels were not subject to criminal
liability for subsequent misappropriation. This immunity was
conferred by the act of transferring legal possession, and it terminated when the recipient, usually a bailee, either returned possession to the owner or delivered the goods to another party. It is
striking that the rule of possessorial immunity emerged in all
major Western legal systems." That this phenomenon occurred
suggests that possessorial immunity expressed a shared Western
sense for the kinds of relationships that ought to be exempt from
the criminal law.
The transferring of possession was presumably -taken to be an
important means of private ordering, a way of establishing a privately structured understanding about the management of money,
tools, animals, and other chattels. If that relationship should miscarry in a dishonest misappropriation, the harm was apparently
felt to be private rather than public. It was an injury compensable, to be sure, under the common law writs of detinue s and later
trover,' 9 but it was not a matter for the criminal courts.
Even before the eighteenth century, the rule of possessorial
immunity underwent substantial modifications. Parliament intervened in 1529 to deny servants immunity as to articles received
directly from their masters. 20 Tenants of rooms similarly lost
protection of the rule in the late seventeenth century.2 ' Yet pos" In French, German and Russian law, one in possession of goods does not
commit larceny by misappropriating them to his advantage.

See L. LAMBERT,

TRAITL DE DROIT PiNAL SPECIAL 214-15 (1968) (French law); A. SCHOENXE & H.
SCHROEDER, STRAGEsETZBUCH 1261-62 (7th ed. 1974) (German law); H. WELZEL,
DAS DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHT 347-48 (iith e d. 1969)
(German law); KusRs
SOVETKSOGO OGOLOVNOGO PRAVA: CHAST' OSOBENNAJA [TEXT ON SOVIET CRIMINAL
LAW: THE SPECIAL PART] 429 (M. Shargorodskij ed. 1973)
(Russian law)
(discussing possession as a condition for the crime of embezzlement of socialist

property).
The Western convergence on the principle of possessory immunity is all the
more remarkable in view of the apparent absence of the rule from both Roman,
see H. JOLOWICZ & B. NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
ROMAN LAW 169 n.2 (1972); T. MoMMSEN, R6A1SCHES STRAFRECHT 735 n.5
(1899); and Biblical jurisprudence, see Exodus 22:7. See generally 2 B. COHEN,
JEWISH AND ROMAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 409-32 (1966).
18
F. MAITLAND, EQUITY; AND THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 356-57
(1913).

'old. at 365 (trover supplanted detinue in actions against bailees).
21 Hen. 8, c. 7 (1529). Possessorial immunity continued to apply to
servants handling goods received from third parties. See pp. 489-90 infra.
21 See 3 & 4 W. & M., C. 7 (1692).

20See
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sessorial immunity continued to govern the vast field of transactions between bailors and bailees until well into the nineteenth
century.22
B. The Principle of Objective Criminality

The principle of objective criminality informs the development of the law of larceny as an implicit guideline rather than
as an explicit norm of the system. In the traditional approach
toward larceny the judges and treatise writers responded to their
intuitive sense of stealing as a recognizable event in the physical
world. The premise was that only those takings conforming to
their shared image of stealing could be punished for larceny.
The principle of objective criminality did not, however, render
the actor's intent irrelevant. From the earliest description in
Bracton 23 to the current cases on larceny, animus jurandi has
always been an unquestioned requirement of larceny. Yet the
traditional approach to larceny took the issue of animus to be
a subsidiary question, dependent upon a preliminary finding of a
manifestly incriminating act. Because the required act provided
presumptive evidence of intent, the issue was seldom, if ever, litigated. If the issue of intent was called into question, it was because appearances were deceptive. Someone might have looked
like a thief without having been one in fact. Like the early use
of the fault concept in torts,2 4 the issue of non-intent functioned
as an excuse that could defeat the normal inference from appearances.
In the next section of the article, we shall examine how the
principle of objective criminality influenced the common law
judges' fashioning of substantive rules of larceny. As a preliminary matter, however, we should establish that it is plausible to
suppose that judges relied upon an intuitive understanding of
thieving in deciding cases. To show that the hypothesis is plausible, we shall argue that a shared image of the thief runs through
Western legal history.
The argument takes as its point of departure the distinction
between manifest and non-manifest thieves, between those whose
thievery is witnessed and those whose thievery is inferred from
a suspect relationship to stolen goods. This distinction is a
rudimentary principle of Western legal thought." In ancient
22

23 Larceny by a bailee was rendered punishable by 20 & 21 Vict., C. 54 (1857).
H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 425 (S. Thorne ed.

1968).. Bracton substituted the phrase animus furandi for the Roman phrase
lucri faciendi causa. See I J. STEPHEN, supra note 4, at 33-34.
24
See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537,
551-56 (1972).
25 Professor Calvert Watkins traces the practice of spontaneously executing
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legal systems, only manifest thievery was subject to capital punishment;"0 the person found with stolen goods was subject at
most to the payment of multiple damages." The most striking
feature of Roman law and other early systems is that the execution of manifest thieves was in private rather than public hands.
According to the Twelve Tables, the fur manifestus - the nighttime thief caught in flagrante- was subject to immediate execution. 8 It is important to note that this was not a form of
self-defense, but a right to kill with impunity.2 9 The exercise of

this right meant that the slain man's kin did not treat the killing
as an occasion for revenge, but rather as a rightful execution.3

According to one exhaustive comparative study, it appears
that this manner of punishing furtum manifestum was a proto-

typical Indo-European legal form.3 Yet as evidenced by Biblical
legal rules, the private execution of manifest thieves was also a
feature of ancient Middle-Eastern legal thought. The Covenant
Code in Exodus recognizes the same distinction between the
nighttime thief caught in the deed 32 and the person caught sellmanifest thieves to Hindu and Greek, as well as Roman law. See Watkins,
Studies in Indo-European Legal Language, Institutions, and Mythology, in INDOEUROPEAN AND INDo-EUROPEANS 321, 342-45 (G. Cardona ed. 1970); Cf. PLATO,
THE LAWS fi 874 ("He that slays a thief entering the house by night with intent
of robbery shall be guiltless."). Watkins' thesis, substantiated by linguistic as
well as legal analysis, is that there is a prototypical form of Indo-European
larceny. For comparative discussions of the similarities of Biblical and Roman
approaches to manifest thievery, see generally D. DAUBE, STUDIES IN BIBUICAi
LAW 235-305 (1947).
2
Watkins, supra note 25, at 338; 3 GAIus, INSTITUTES ITi89, in I F. DE
ZULUETA, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIuS 215-17 (1946) [hereinafter cited as 3 GAIus].
2 According to The Twelve Tables, all cases of "theft ...
[where] the
thief is [not] caught in the act . . ." were subject to a penalty of double damages. Table VIII, § i6, in 2 ANCIENT ROMAN STATUTES II (A. Johnson, et al.
ed. i96i). If it was a case of "detected" theft, the judgment was for triple damages; apparently, this form of liability presupposed finding the goods on the accused's premises after a search with witnesses. See H. JoLowlcz & B. NICHOLAS,
supra note 17, at 167. Gaius notes that at a later stage the penalty for furturn
mnanifestum became fourfold damages in cases of rapina (robbery). See 3 GAius,
supra note 26, at ff 209. For the use of multiple damages in the Biblical approach
to theft, see note 35 infra.
2
See Table VIII, § 12, in 2 ANCIENT RomrA STATUTES II (A. Johnson, et al.
ed. ig6x).
29 Watkins, supra note 25, at 338; T. MOMAISEN, supra note 17, at 751. At
a later stage, the use of force came to be treated as a form of self-defense. See
H. JoLoWiCz & B. NICHOLAS, supra note 17, at 169 n.9.
" Table VIII, § 12, in 2 ANCIENT Ro-AN STATUTES I (A. Johnson, et al. ed.
g6i) (thief is killed "lawfully").
"1See Watkins, supra note 25, at 338-45.
22 ExodUs 22:2. That this is a penal provision rather than a rule of selfdefense is suggested by its being located among rules pertaining to theft and by
punishment by multiple damages. There is some dispute whether this provision
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ing, slaughtering, or possessing a stolen animal.33 The former
could be killed without blood guilt; 3" the latter was subject at
most to the payment of monetary damages.
The primordial forms of larceny bore two features that continued to mark the law of larceny in its Western European
development. First, the thief had to steal from an enclosure.",
The Bible refers to the thief as "one digging under." " Second,
the concept of furtum manilestum presupposed that when the

thief did attack another's enclosure, some peculiar form of conduct became manifest. This assumption was implicit in the institution of private execution. There could be no private killing
with impunity if there were doubts in the community whether the

slain man was a thief. If there were not to be a blood feud, the
facts on which the slayer relied to vindicate the deed had to be
highly public - either visible to others or readily invoked. That
the thief was slain in another's enclosure was doubtlessly important, but it seems also to have been critical that people could

readily agree on when persons breaking the close were acting like
is an interpolation in the text. Compare A. PHiLLIPs, ANCIENT IsRAEL'S CRIMINAL
LAW 92 (970)
(arguing that provision belongs with early rules pertaining to
homicide), with B. JACKsoN, THEFT IN EARLY JEWISH LAW 206 (1972) (arguing
against interpolation).
33
Exodus 21:37 (killing or selling an ox or sheep); id. 22:3 (defendant found
in possession of stolen ox, ass, or sheep).
3"Exodus 22:1. There is some disagreement whether this provision confers a
right of private execution comparable to the right to execute the fur inanijestus.
Jackson argues that the right described in Exodus 22:1 is a form of self-defense,
not a right to punish. See B. JACKSON, supra note 32, at 155. Daube says that
this was a later development in rabbinic interpretation. See D. DAUBE, SUpra note
25, at 242.

35Exodus 21:37 (fivefold for stealing and then killing or selling an ox; fourfold for doing the same to a sheep) ; id. 22:3 (double damages if the stolen animal
is found alive in the defendant's possession).
"e Watkins claims that according to Roman law, the thief had to be caught
inside the enclosure. See Watkins, supra note 25, at 338. This view is supported
by Gaius, who lists the various interpretations of furtum manifestum and expresses a preference for the view that the thief is a fur inanijestus if caught inside
the place the deed occurred. See 3 GAius, supra note 26, at 184.
"Exodus 22:i (ganav bamahteret). This feature of breaking the victim's perimeter may well be the source of possessorial immunity in the later Western law
of theft. Though ancient law did not reconize possessorial immunity, it did
acknowledge the significance of perimeters. Watkins considers perimeters or enclosures to have been a structural form in the prototypical Indo-European forms
of larceny. The same underlying form is expressed (I) in the rule requiring the
thief to be caught in an enclosure and (2) in the rule holding that finding the
object in the suspect's house after a formal search cum lance et licio rendered the
suspect a fur manifestus. See Watkins, supra note 25, at 336. This deeper form
may be the basis for the almost magical boundary signified by acquiring possession
over an object.
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thieves.3 A system of private execution is not one that can
tolerate mistakes.
If there was a characteristic form of thieving, what was it?

There is no doubt that the dominant motif was furtive or stealthful conduct, as the etymology of these adjectives suggests.3 9
Yet the image of furtive conduct was blended in some cases with
an element of force. Larceny at common law presupposed a
trespass, and trespasses were done vi et armis. In most legal
systems, however, forcible takings from the person eventually
crystallized as the separate offense of rapina,40 Raub, 41 or
robbery.
Yet forcible seizures in the absence of the owner
continued to be seen as part of the composite image of manifest
thievery.
The transition from the Twelve Tables to the medieval law
of larceny should be seen as a series of efforts to convert the right
of private execution into the formalized public trial that we know
8

It is clear that according to Roman law the jurtum inanijesturn was con-

ceived of as a natural fact; it was not subject to definition by the positive law.
Gaius replied to those who claimed, in effect, that a manifest theft was whatever
the law said it was: "[S]tatute can no more turn a thief who is not manifest into
a manifest thief than it can turn into a thief one who is not a thief at all, or into
an adulterer or homicide one who is neither the one nor the other." 3 GAIus,
supra note 26, at 194. It is also of some interest, though of uncertain probative
significance, that prior to the twentieth century, statutes and cases typically
referred to thieves without ever bothering to define what they were; other scholars
have been struck by this pattern in Western legislation. See 3 J. STEPraN, supra
note 4, at 129; K. DiICEL, DER TATBESTAND DES DIEBSTAHLS NACH DEUTSCHEM
REcHT 16 (1877).
"0The word "furtive" derives from "fur," meaning thief in Latin. 4 OXFORD
ENGLisH DICTIONARY 620 (1933). The word "stealth" derives from the same root
as "steal." io id. at 884, 887.
4" According to the law of the Twelve Tables, the concept of jurtum apparently
included larceny coupled with violence. See T. MomIsEN, supra note 17, at 737
n.6. Gaius notes that the praetor introduced a new action for fourfold damages
against those who rob -i.e., commit theft by violence. See 3 GAIus supra note
26, at f1 209.
41 Prior to the CONSTITUTIO CAROLINA CRIAMINALIS § 157 (532), the major distinction in German law of theft was between a secret taking and a open taking;
Raub was the latter. See K. DICKEL, supra note 38, at i6 (1877); R. ECKARDT,
CONTROVERSN IN DER LEHRE volt DIEBSTAHL 35 (1899). After the Carolina, Raub
became the offense of taking from a person with force or the threat of force.
See K. DICKEL, supra at 16; see STGB § 249 (Lachner 1975).
2 In the early common law, robbery was an open taking; theft, a secret
taking. See 2 F. POLLOc K & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW 494 (1911).
By the time of Coke, the felony had received its present definition. See E. COKE,
supra note 12, at *67. The distinction between secret and open theft is retained
in the current codes in the Soviet Union. R.S.F.S.R. [i96i] UGOL. KOD. § 144
(defining krasha as the "secret taking of the personal property of another"); id.
§ 145 (defining grabjesh as the "open taking of personal property of another");
id. § 146 (Soviet analog to robbery).
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today. One of the early steps in this development was the
qualification of private execution by the preliminary duty of the
outcry.4 3 The function of the outcry was to communicate the
impending execution to the rest of the community; it provided
assurance that the slayer was not going to be treated as a
criminal." In Roman law, the institution of the outcry functioned
to broaden the concept of fur manifestus to include daytime
thieves who offered resistance.4

Medieval English common law carried forth the concept of
the fur manifestus, but with gradual recognition that a trial had
to precede execution. By the time of the thirteenth century the
right of private execution had become a public right of execution
after a summary trial in the field. 4 Eventually, the private right
of execution became a species of the right of self-defense. By
the early sixteenth century, killing thieves and robbers was taken
to be a form of justifiable homicide, regulated by statute, 47 rather
than a private act of justice.48
Obviously important changes in larceny occurred as the
criminal courts displaced private authority to punish thieves. 9
Yet the core of larceny remained the execution of manifest
thieves. The thief no longer had to be caught in the act, but his
deed, as reconstructed from the evidence, had to conform to the
same image of the thief that underlay the law of furtum ManiJestum.5 ° The principle of objective criminality is simply the
"aWatkins, supra note 25, at 339-40; Pugsley, Furtun in the XII Tables, 4
IR. JUR. (n.s.) 139, i5 (1969). The early common law institution of the Hue
and Cry, discussed in detail in E. COKE, supra note 12, at *ii6-i8 is comparable.
*4H. JoLowIcz & B. NICHrOLAS, supra note x7, at x69 n.9 (distinguishing
between two distinct functions of the outcry: (i) a call to neighbors to witness
the act and (2) a declaration that the defender was prepared to justify his act).
" Table VIII, § 13, in 2 ANCIENT ROmAN STATUTES II (A. Johnson et at., cd.
i965).
46 See i BRITTON, ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 56 (F. Nichols tran. 1865 ed.).
42 24 Hen. 8, c. 5 (i532). The statute recognizes the right to use deadly force
against evil-doers attempting "to murder, rob or burgarily to break mansionhouses."
4 The tendency in both Roman and Biblical law had also been to domesticate
the private right of execution as a right of self-defense. See notes 29 & 34 supra.
" The basic changes were (I) the disappearance of the rule that the thief had
to take from the owner's enclosure, see note 36 supra, (2) the emergence of
possessorial immunity, see p. 472 supra, and (3) the elimination of Jurtum isec
mnanifestum as a basis for punitive damages. The assumption implicit in the text
is that these three changes are related. On the relationship between the first two,
see note 37 supra.
'o Note Bracton's description of how larceny was to be alleged in an appeal
of larceny: "that he took the said property feloniously and stealthily and
larcenously and against the king's peace and thievishly bore it away." 2 H.
BRACTON, supra note 23, at 426.
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judicial continuation of the standards governing the ancient institution of manifest thievery.
II.

INTERPRETING THE COMMON LAW

In this section we turn to three enigmas of the common law
of larceny. The first is the rule of "breaking bulk" which provided an exception to the principle of possessorial immunity.
The second is the complex of rules defining the contours of possession for purposes of possessorial immunity. The third is a
relatively recent line of cases reversing convictions of would-be
thieves whose taking is committed in a prearranged trap. Analysis
of the first two problems will help us understand the interplay
between possessorial immunity and objective criminality in structuring common law larceny. Investigating the third problem will
be important for two reasons. First, these cases reversing the
convictions of those who clearly intend to steal demonstrate the
survival of objective criminality after the early nineteenth century metamorphosis of larceny. Second, these puzzling cases
provide an occasion for assaying some of the theoretical quandaries implicit in the principle of objective criminality.
A. The Carrier's Case
The Carrier's Case,51 decided in the Star Chamber in 1473,
represents the first major judicial extension of the medieval common law of larceny. A carrier had made a bargain with a merchant to carry some bales of dyer's weed to Southampton; instead
he took them to another place, broke open the bales and took the
contents.52 All or part of the goods thus taken appear to have
fallen into the hands of the Sheriff of London, who was sued by
the original owner -. an alien merchant who had come with a
royal safe conduct covering his goods - for the return of his
property.5 3 The Sheriff's defense was that the goods were forfeit
to the King as waif, because the taking had been a felony.54
The impediment to treating the taking as a felony was the
rule of possessorial immunity. Chief Justice Bryan took this rule
to be decisive: The bailee, having lawfully acquired possession
" Y.B. Pasch. 13 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 5 (1473), 64 SELDEN Soc'y 30 (i945) [cited
hereinafter to the Selden Society reprint and translation].
52 See id. at 30 (reporter's note).
See id. at 34 (reporter's note).
14 Id. (reporter's note). Waifed goods are those feloniously taken and then
abandoned; these are normally forfeited to the Crown. See i W. BLAcXsToNE,
supra note 12, at *296-97 (explaining the rule as an inducement to owners to
pursue thieves and recapture stolen goods before they are abandoned).
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of the goods, could not take them vi et armis and therefore the
taking could not be said to be felony or trespass. 5 Yet in the
end the judges were of the opinion that the taking had been a
felony. They could not concur on a rationale,"6 but Lord Chokke's
opinion developed the argument that eventually became the rule
of the case.57 Chokke argued that 's
[T]he things which were in the bale were not given [to the
bailee], but the bales as chose entire . . . , in which case if he

had given away the bales or sold them, it would not be felony,
but when he broke open [the bales] and took out of [them]
what was inside, he did this without warrant [and it is felony].
This is the language that generated the rule of "breaking bulk,"
which remained a prominent exception to possessorial immunity
until the mid-nineteenth century. 9 In the final stages of the
" 64 SELDEN Soc'Y at 30-31 (opinion of Bryan, C.J.C.P.).
" The various justices advanced several theories on which the bailee's taking
could be considered a larceny. Huse, for example, thought that a felony was
committed when the carrier "claim[ed] the goods feloniously without cause from
the party with intent to defraud him to whom the property belongs . . ." Id. at
31. The Chancellor and Molyneux also seem to have held this position. Vavasour
and Laken sought to distinguish between a bailment, in which there is actual
delivery and possession in the bailee, and a bargain to carry, which was thought
to give only a limited warrant to take the goods. Thus, if the carrier by his
conversion revealed an intent not to comply with the terms of the warrant, his
initial taking was felonious. See id. at 31 (Vavasour), 33 (Laken, J.K.B.). Nedeham took this argument a step further and maintained that possession determined
when the carrier went outside the purpose for which he had been given the bales.
See id. at 33 (Nedeham, J.K.B.). This analysis would have assimilated the case
to those in which the taker had custody merely, and not possession. See pp.
486-87 infra.
57 See E. COKE, supra note 12, at *107; M. DALTON, TnE COUNTRY JUSTICE
324 (I655); i M. HALE,supra note 12, at 504-05; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
12, at *230.

" 64 SELDEN Soc'v at 32. This principle does not appear to have been without precedent. Chokke gives an example: "[Ilf a man is given a tun of wine
to carry, if he sells the tun, it is not felony or trespass, but if he took out twenty
pints it is a felony, for the twenty pints were not given to him . . ." Id.; di.
Rattlesdene v. Gruneston, Y.B. Pasch. io Edw. 2, p1. 37 (1317), 54 SELDEN Soc'v
140 (935).
" So far as the law of England from roughly i6oo to i8oo is expressed in the

leading treatises, The Carrier's Case was viewed as establishing two different circumstances in which a carrier or bailee could be found guilty of larceny. In the
first, the culprit breaks bulk and carries away the contents animo Jurandi. This
was a felony at the time of the breaking and taking, not at the time of initial
receipt of the goods. See M. DALTON, supra note 57, at 324; E. COKE, supra note
12, at *107; i M. HALE, supra note 12, at 505; i W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 135 (1726) ; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *230. In the second set of
circumstances, the carrier, having received the pack and "carr[ied] it to the place
appointed , . . . take[s] the whole pack animno furandi . . . ." E. COKE, supra
note 12, at *I07. See 64 SELDEN Soc'" at 33 (opinion of Nedeham, J.K.B.); M.
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metamorphosis of larceny, Parliament eliminated possessorial
immunity in 1857 and brought all defalcating bailees within the
bounds of the criminal law. °
No one in the last century, so far as I know, has uttered a
kind word for the rationale of The Carrier's Case." Assuming
that the rule of "breaking bulk" was an arbitrary manipulation
of the law, most commentators have sought to explain the decision - to find felony and yet to return the alien merchant's
goods on the basis of his royal safe conduct -as
a concession
63
to royal policy 62 or to the economic imperatives of the age.

These sociological arguments are a good example of the way

in which legal theorists go astray when they assume that the
forms of the law always respond to social and political forces.

4

DALTON, supra note 57, at 324; 1 M. HALE, supra note 12, at 505; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *230. It is important to note that fxom the beginning,
the rationale for this second rule stemming from The Carrier's Case was that
upon the carrier's delivery of the goods to their destination, "his possession is
determined," 64 SELDEN Soc'y at 33 (opinion of Nedeham, J.K.B.), E. COKE,
supra at *o7-o8 ("for the delivery had taken his [sic] effect, and the privity
of the bailment is determined"); accord, e.g., I M. HALE, supra note 12, at 505;
4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *230.
60 20 & 21 Vict., c. 54, § 4 (1857). Regarding similar American legislative revisions of the rule of "breaking bulk," see 2 J. BISHoP, CRIMINAL LAW 479 (6th
ed. 1877).
"1Stephen treated the rule of "breaking bulk" as an "obscure distinction resting on no definite principle." 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 4, at 140; accord, R.
PERKINS, supra note I, at 219 ("absurd distinction"); T. PLUCKNEIT, A CONCISE
HISTORY Or THE COiMON LAW 424 (4th ed. 1948) ("devious reasoning"); L.
WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 304 (2d ed. 1975) (akin
to "Humpty Dumpty's doctrine").
2 Stephen explained the decision as a compromise between the Chancellor,
seeking on behalf of the King to protect the alien merchant, and the judges, seeking
to maintain the established doctrine. See 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 4, at 139;
accord, T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 6i, at 424.
"3See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 14-33. Hall argues that the most powerful
forces of the time-the political interest of the King in allying himself with the
rising commercial classes, the business interest of merchants in need of a secure
carrying trade, the influence of the Italian merchants who dominated the English
wool trade-pressed the court to hold the carrier's conduct felonious. See id. at
33. Hall assumes that subjection of the carrier to criminal liability was in the
interest of the alien merchant, see id. at 31-32, but this assumption is clearly
wrong in the actual case.
4 The subject of larceny seems to invite reliance on sociological arguments.
Another fashionable claim is that the law failed to expand prior to nineteenth
century because of "unwillingness on the part of the judges to enlarge the limits
of a capital offense." Commonwealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523, 527, 30 N.E. 364,
364-65 (1892) ; see J. HALL, supra note 4, at 118-32. This is a highly speculative
claim. It is true that in 169i Parliament declared many forms of larceny to be
nonclergyable and therefore subject in principle to the death penalty. 3 W. & M.,
c. 9, § 1 (169i). Yet Stephen notes that in the eighteenth century "[i]n practice
the punishment of death was inflicted in only a small portion of the cases in
which the sentence was passed." i J. STEPHEN, supra note 4, at 471. Though
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If the judges had been interested only in returning the goods
to the alien merchant, it would have been far easier to reach
that result simply by concluding that the taking was not felonious. The goods would then have been returned to the merchant as his property. Holding that the taking was felonious
meant that they were waif, which in turn meant that they were
forfeited to the King and therefore properly retained by the
Sheriff of London. " Holding that the goods were waif, therefore,
required an additional legal innovation, namely the principle that
the ordinary law of waif would not apply in the case of an alien
merchant who had been given a safe conduct by the King.
The disagreement among the judges in the Star Chamber
provided a variety of rules that could have been drawn from the
decision in The Carrier'sCase. Subsequent commentators could
have agreed with the Chancellor that felony was according to
intent regardless of possession 6 6 or with Vavasour that felonious
intent negated the carrier's authority to take the bales and prevented him from acquiring the kind of possession that would
have conferred possessorial immunity.6 7 But in the tradition
emanating from the case, courts and commentators balked at
these rationalia; they tied the finding of felony to the one fact
that most clearly manifested the actor's felonious design, the
fact that he opened the bales.
The rule of "breaking bulk" reveals the principle of objective
criminality at work.6 One characteristic of the thief was his
the death penalty often was ordered, it was typically commuted into a sentence
of transportation to the colonies. Id. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that aversion to the death penalty, by itself, accounts for acquittals in cases like The King
v. Bazeley, 68 Eng. Rep. 517 (1799), and The King v. Waite, 68 Eng. Rep. 117
(1743), discussed at note 83 infra.
6 See note 54 supra. The doctrine of waif poses an additional difficulty for
Jerome Hall's interpretation of The Carrier's Case. Hall assumes that subjecting
carriers to criminal liability for misappropriating the contents of packages entrusted to them would generally promote the interests of the merchant class. See
J. HALL, supra note 4, at 31. Yet the immediate impact of the decision to hold
such misappropriations felony was to subject merchants to the risk that their
goods would be forfeit to the King as waif; only aliens under safe conduct would
be exempt from such forfeiture. With the merchant's interest amply protected by
civil remedies, see id. at 32, it may fairly be doubted that the decision in The
Carrier's Case actually promoted the interests of the rising commercial class.
6 See note 56 supra.
67
See id.
6 Blackstone was apparently the first commentator to explicate the rule of
"breaking bulk" as an instance of manifest criminality. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
suPra note 12, at *230:
But if the carrier opens a bale or pack of goods, or pierces a vessel of
wine, and takes away part thereof, these are larcenies; for here the animus
furandi is manifest; since [in this case] he had otherwise no inducement to
open the goods.
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taking swiftly and violently. That aspect of thieving is captured
in the moment of breaking bulk. The thief breaking bulk could
0
be caught in the deed, in flagrante.
Lawyers of the time could
perceive thieving in the act of breaking open the bales; they
were less likely to sense thievery in the acts of selling or giving
away the bales. Consequently, these other forms of misappropriation remained within the protection of possessorial immunity.
The exception of breaking bulk was one that proved the rule:
Conduct that at no point featured behavior characteristic of
thieving remained immune from the jurisdiction of the criminal
courts.
This interpretation of The Carrier'sCase builds on the assumption that in the fifteenth century the doctrine of furtum
manifestum continued to shape the course of the English law.
This assumption is more than an interpretative lens for perceiving
what others have regarded as obscure. The opinion of Nedeham
refers explicitly to the principle of objective criminality and thus
corroborates the ongoing force of manifest thievery in the law of
the time. In his reported words: 7 °
[I] t has been held that a man can take his own goods feloniously. For instance, if I give goods to a man to take care of,
and I come secretly like a felon because I want to recover damages against him by writ of detinue, and I take the goods secretly
like a felon, it is felony.
The critical factor in this example is the manner of taking, and
in the case of the carrier who broke bulk it is the same. In the
former situation, the taking is secret; in the latter, forcible. But
in both cases the taking conforms to the shared image of a felonious taking.
The significance of The Carrier'sCase is that it was received
in the tradition as holding that objective criminality should prevail over the principle of possessorial immunity. The ancient
" It is heuristically useful to ask whether the culprit could be "caught in the
deed." Only those whose conduct was manifestly criminal could be identified and
caught as thieves while they were in the act of thieving. Compare the execution
of adulterous lovers. See Deuteronomy 22:22.
"o64 SELDEN Soc'y at 33 (emphasis added).
The question whether an owner could steal his own goods was resolved in the
common law by developing the notion of special property in bailees and others
who held property by license of the owner. E. COKE, supra note 12, at *1o; 2 E.
EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN at 654 (x8o3). A conflicting theory was that the
owner's liability derived from his intent to hold the bailee liable in detinue. See
i M. HALE, supra note 12, at 513. The latter view treated the owner as someone
who could be liable only because he intended fraudulently to misuse legal remedies, thus bringing the case within the category of in fraudem legis, see note
123 infra.
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notion of the manifest thief proved to be more influential than
the practice of exempting the conduct of bailees from the law of
larceny. Notwithstanding Nedeham's language in this case, the
principle of objective criminality usually operated covertly in the
common law. Discovering its influence will generally require an
analysis more subtle than is needed to see "breaking bulk" as the
legal embodiment of the shared vision of the thief.
B. The Contours of Possession
Whatever the momentum generated by The Carrier's Case,
further rending of the possessorial veil was to await the close of
the eighteenth century. 1 Rather than seek new exceptions to the
rule of possessorial immunity, the courts fastened their attention
on determining when the veil of immunity fit and when it did not.
That meant that courts and commentators undertook as one of
their central concerns to determine the boundaries of legal possession.
At early stages of the common law, the concept of possession
coincided roughly with actual dominion over an object. 2 In the
course of the law's evolution, the courts gradually recognized,
and then widened, a gap between actual control and legal possession. In The Carrier'sCase, it was recognized that a guest in
an inn does not acquire possession of eating utensils or bed linen.73
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there was considerable
controversy whether servants enjoyed possessorial immunity for
misappropriation of goods acquired from their masters. After
some vacillation 14 it was settled that a servant's custody did not
amount to possession as long as the servant was on the master's
premises or in the master's company. 75 Parliament intervened in
this development in 1529 with a statute that subjected servants
to the law of larceny as to all valuable property entrusted to them
by their masters. 76 In due course, however, this statute was
"See pp. 504-07 infra.
" See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISu LAW 336 (6th ed., rev.
1934).
73
See 64 SELDEN Soc'Y at 33 (opinion of Nedeham).
" Compare Y.B. Mich. 3 Hen. 7 pl. 9 (1488) with Y.B. Hil. 2x Hen. 7 pl. 2r
(i5o6) translated in C. KENNy, A SELECTION or CASES ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE
ENGLISH CRMI AL LAW 216 (8th ed. 1935) [hereinafter cited as KENNY]; see
3 W. HOLDSWORTir, supra note 72, at 363-64.
" See KENNY, supra note 74, at 216; 3 W. HOLDSWORT11, supra note 72, at
365 & n.2.
76 21 Hen. 8, c. 7 (1529). The statute does not formally alter the concept of
possession; it provides that servants who "go away" with "caskets, jewels, money,
goods, or chattels" which had been "delivered to them by their master or mistress
. . . to the intent to steal the same . . . shall be deemed and adjudged [to have
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interpreted not to apply to the goods that servants received from
third parties."
In these disputes about the scope of possessorial immunity,
the underlying factual transaction is always the same. Someone
hands the defendant an object or the defendant picks it up with
the owner's permission; the question is whether the acquisition
of the physical object is sufficient to acquire legal possession. In
the cases of crockery and linen in another's inn, the user would
not expect eventually to acquire possession or property in the
chattel. The problem is more subtle if the transaction is the
sort in which the user normally expects to acquire possession
or property. This more difficult variation was posed in the midseventeenth century case of Chisser,7 in which the defendant
bolted from a store without paying for two cravats the shopkeeper handed him for inspection. The Exchequer found the
taking to be felonious; despite the handing over of the cravat,
the owner retained legal possession and was therefore protected
until actual sale of the ties. In this situation as well as in the
cases of the guest and the servant, drawing the line of possession
short of physical control meant that one could commit larceny by
carrying off an object already in one's hands. Thus the widening
of the gap between legal possession and actual control functioned
as a way of restricting possessorial immunity71
committed] felony . . . ." In time, larceny by servants was molded into the conceptual system by holding that in this class of cases servants did not get possession.
See The King v. Bass, i68 Eng. Rep. 228 (1782); 2 E. EAST, supra note 70, at
555-6o.
" See 73 Eng. Rep. 12, 12-13 (K.B. 1533) (opinion by Englefielde).
"s83 Eng. Rep. 142 (1678). There are three paragraphs to the report. The
first paragraph sets forth the facts (essentially that Anne Charteris handed Chisser
two "crevats" and that a few moments later he ran out of the shop) and the question whether it should be adjudged felony; the second paragraph presents the
reporter Sir T. Raymond's view that the case could be viewed as a felony according to Chisser's intent when he first received the tie; the third paragraph argues
that Chisser was guilty as of the moment he ran from the store, for when Anne
Charteris handed him the two cravats "they were not out of her possession by
such delivery," id. at 142-44. The text relies on the third paragraph. Thomas
Leach, see i W. HAwxiNs, PLEAS OF THE CRWN 135 n.i (6th ed. T. Leach 1787)
and Pollock and Wright, see F. PoLLocx & R. WRIGHT, AN ESSAY ON POSSESSION
IN THE CoraoN LAW 140 (1888), both read Chisser according to the third
paragraph. Whether one stresses the second or third paragraph of this opinion is
of critical importance in construing The King v. Pear, i68 Eng. Rep. 208 (,779).
See pp. 506-07, 513 & note 176 infra.
"o The case law in France, Germany and the Soviet Union is equally sensitive
to the problem of restricting possession to some subset of cases of physical control.
See, e.g., Judgment of March 6, 1968, [1968] D.S. Jur. 395 (Cass. Crim.) (salesgirl who took home and converted clothes from her shop guilty of larceny); Judgment of June 11, 1965, 1966 GOLTDAMIERS ARcHIV FOR STRAPRECHT 244 (German
Supreme Court) (customer who absconded with clothes after having tried them
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At least two factors, the existence of a private agreement to

transfer a taken object and the presence of objective criminality,
influenced the contours of legal possession, and thus the scope of

possessorial immunity. First, the doctrine as it developed responded to the principle of respecting private agreements about

the control and use of personal property. Yet it is by no means
easy to account for the types of relationships protected under
this principle. The explanation is not to be found in the principle of assumption of risk, for it is hard to see why a man

should not assume the risk of misappropriation by his servant,
whom he knows well, but should in general assume the risk of
misappropriation by a carrier whom he knows less well. 0 An
alternative view of the impact of this factor is that only by authorizing the removal of goods from his premises does the owner

surrender the protection of the criminal law. This explains why
the innkeeper retained possession over his crockery, why even

before the statute of 1529 the master retained possession over
goods used by his servants on his premises or in his presence,,'
and why the shopkeeper retained possession over goods examined
in his shop. Yet this perspective fails to provide a rationale for

possessorial immunity where it did attach. While an owner might
naturally expect that he has not surrendered possession when an

object remains in his presence or on his premises, this sentiment
does not account for the owner losing the protection of the crim-

inal law just because he authorized the use of an object beyond
the limits of his home or shop.

A more plausible rationale for possessorial immunity might
be that it should apply only where the relationship between the
two parties is defined entirely by an agreement concerning the

use of the chattel. The master's supplying tools and the host's
on with the shopkeeper's permission guilty of larceny) ; UGOOVNOE PRAVO: CHAST'
OSOBENNAIA [CRiAniNAL LAW: THE SPECIAL PART] 272 (N.I. Zagorodnikova &
V. Kirichenko, eds. 1968) (reference to person asked to watch luggage in train
station guilty of larceny when he took it). The formal ground of all these decisions was that the degree of control imparted by the owner was insufficient to
establish possession (possession, Gewahrsam, vladenie) and that therefore the rule
of possessory immunity, recognized in all of these systems, see note 17 supra, did
not apply.
° Paley attempted to explain such phenomena as bailees' immunity from
criminal liability for misappropriation on the principle that "the law will not
interpose its sanctions to protect negligence and credulity, or to supply the place
of domestic care and prudence." See 2 W. PALEY, WORKS (MORAL PHILOSOPHY)
372 (1825). He considered the refusal of the law to bestow a similar immunity
on defalcating servants due to the fact that "no practical vigilance could watch
the offender." Id. Why an owner can protect himself against dishonest bailees
more easily than against dishonest servants remains a mystery.
"1See KENNY, supra note 74, at 216.
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supplying linen or crockery were incidental to relationships rendered more complex by expectations of continuing interaction,
the events occurring under the roof of the owner, or a structure
of power and dependency. Possessorial immunity required a relationship defined solely by contract, in which the visible face of

the other looks solely upon the chattel that binds the parties together. Though we find the principle of possessorial immunity
as early as the thirteenth century,8 2 it may be that the institution

was well suited for a form of commercial life in which contractual
relationships with strangers were seen as private matters subject

to autonomous regulation and therefore properly exempt from
the jurisdiction of the criminal courts.

This analysis helps us isolate two determinants of the puzzling institution of possessorial immunity in the case of servants.

Servants enjoyed possessorial immunity as to goods received from
third parties, but not as to goods received from their masters.

The anomaly is readily explained if we focus on the owner's surrendering control over the object. In the case of goods received

from third parties, the owner had no protection to surrender until
he acquired possession over the goods and, therefore, the principle of retaining goods on the premises could not apply. From this

point of view, the immunity of the servant over goods received
from third parties arises only from a defect in the owner's status: 8 3 He has not yet acquired possession. An alternative account
82 See note 13 supra.
83 Determining when the servant transferred possession to the employer proved

to be the most subtle problem of the common law of larceny. It was relatively
easy to determine when carriers surrender possession by delivery of the goods
to their destination, see note 59 supra; the moment was well-marked, and after
delivery the carrier typically had nothing more to do with the goods. The servant's surrendering possession to his master is not so well-defined; a clerk who
transfers funds to his employer's drawer or safe might still have occasion to deal
with the funds in the course of his employment. Compare The King v. Spears,
i68 Eng. Rep. 512 (1798) (possession transferred to employer), with The King
v. Waite, 168 Eng. Rep. 1i7 (1743) (possession not transferred). The courts were
forced to look for an obscure point of delivery which was invested with great
symbolic significance.
In response to The King v. Bazeley, i68 Eng. Rep. 517 (2799) (clerk who
pocketed routinely deposited £200 note before transferring daily case to employer's
drawer not guilty of larceny), Parliament subjected servants who misappropriate
goods given them by third parties to criminal liability. See 39 Geo. 3, c. 85 (1799).
The question of delivery then became crucial for distinguishing the new, less
severe crime of embezzlement from the older crime of larceny, see, e.g., Morgan
v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 713, 47 S.W.2d 543 (i932) (embezzlement because no
transfer had occurred); Commonwealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523, 30 N.E. 364
(1892) (possession not transferred); Rex. v. Suliens, 168 Eng. Rep. 122
(1826)
(possession not transferred). Thus, the complexities introduced by the third party
cases were carried forward.
These complexities need not have arisen in the common law. Though German
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emerges if we focus on the kinds of relationships involved. The
relationship between the third party and the servant was precisely
the kind of limited interaction, defined solely by the transfer of
the object, that triggered possessorial immunity. Yet the relationship between master and servant was the paradigm of the more
complex, ongoing relationship in which the transfer of the object
failed to confer immunity.
We can acquire another perspective on this array of problems
by turning to the second factor, that the courts should punish all
cases, but only those cases, exhibiting manifest thievry. As the
carrier could not be criminally liable for keeping or selling the
bales, others who handled goods off the owner's premises acquired
immunity from the inevitable ambiguity in their having, using,
and even selling the goods. In other situations, the user's scope
of control was so limited that his using it in any other way was
suspect. The guest's walking out with the host's drinking cup fits
this test, as does Chisser's running from the store with a necktie.
A plausible way of looking at most cases on the contours of possession is to see them as a medium for bringing the principle of
possessorial immunity in line with the judge's image of acting like
a thief."4 By informing decisions on the scope of possession, the
law follows the rule of possessorial immunity in distinguishing between larceny and
embezzlement, see note 17 supra, the German courts apparently never got embroiled in the mysteries of an employee's symbolically transferring possession to
the employer's domain. The rule today is that an employee's misappropriation of
goods, whether received from third parties or from the employer, is punished as
larceny. See Judgment of May 3, 1897, 30 RGSt. 88. The common law could
have taken either of two doctrinal routes to the same conclusion. First, it could
have been held that the employee was merely a conduit whereby the employer
received possession whenever goods came into the employee's hands. This solution appears to have been unacceptable because of the great force of the implicit
rule that possession can only pass when an object changes hands. One might receive custody without possession, but never possession without custody. Second,
it could have been held that employer and employee received joint possession over
objects received by the latter. The obstacle to adopting this solution was the common law notion of "taking" as acquiring possession and not as depriving another
of possession, see 2 E. EAST, supra note 70, at 558 (one in joint possession of an
object does not commit larceny by appropriating it to his exclusive use). Yet
there is no reason not to define the required act of taking as the deprivation of
possession without regard to the taker's acquisition of possession. This is the view
implicit in German law, which was readily assimilated the case of joint possession to the set of cases subject to prosecution for larceny, see A. ScnoaNxE & H.
SCHROEDER, supra note 17, at 1260; R. MAURACH, DEUTSCIIES STAFRECHT: DESONDERER TaIL 203-04 (sth ed. 1969). By so limiting the principle of possessory
immunity, German law has remained untroubled by the complexities that have
led prominent common law jurists to doubt the rationality of the distinction between larceny and embezzlement, see pp. 469-70 supra.
84 It is important to see that there are two different ways of interpreting pos-
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principle of manifest criminality expanded criminal liability much
as it had done in the Carrier'sCase. But the courts had no need
for a dramatic breakthrough like the doctrine of breaking bulk
when the concept of possession provided a low visibility device
for bringing doctrine into line with the principle that he who acts
like a thief ought to be punished as one.
C. Objective Criminality and Staged Larceny
In the foregoing two studies of common law rules, we traced
the influence of manifest criminality in generating an expansion
of criminal liability. We turn now to a reciprocal phenomenon a line of predominantly modern cases in which the absence of
manifest criminality accounts for the acquittal of obviously dishonest and dangerous people. These cases are of special interest
to us, for they illustrate the survival of the principle of objective
criminality in the twentieth century.
The cases we shall examine follow a recurrent pattern. The
suspect seeks to steal from the owner by enlisting the aid of the
latter's employee. The employee in turn informs the owner, who
then instructs his employee to feign cooperation in order to catch
the suspect in the act. The owner or the police keep watch as the
suspect goes through the motions of stealing; then they apprehend him. There is a surprising number of decisions in this vein
of case law,85 and the opinions interweave a number of nearly
appropriate doctrines in an attempt to explain why the conviction
should be affirmed or reversed. Some sense that the issue is entrapment 0 Yet apart from the trap's being staged by private
parties rather than the police, these are typically cases in which
session as a required element of larceny. One view is that possession is the interest
against which the crime is committed. This view is prominent in the AngloAmerican literature, see, e.g., R. PERKINS, supra note i, at 195-96, even though
the intent required today is the intent to deprive the owner of his property (not
the possessor of his possession), see Rex. v. Cabbage, 168 Eng. Rep. 8o9 (i815) ; 3
J. STEPHEN, supra note 4, at 132. The more plausible view, advanced in the German
literature, is that the act of breaking-possession (Gewahrsamsbruch) is significant
in characterizing the conduct as manifest thievery. See note 14 supra. The latter
view supports the hypothesis that breaking-possession is the heir to the ancient
principle of breaking an enclosure. See note 37 supra.
8 See the cases collected in Annot., io A.L.R. 3d 1121 (1966). Staging a larceny appears to have precluded liability for the taking at Roman law. See T.
MoirmsEN, supra note 17, at 75o n.74.
" The issue of entrapment is typically raised and rejected as a defense. See,
e.g., Jarrott v. State, io8 Tex. Crim. 427, 1 S.W.2d 619 (1927) (phrasing issue as
one of entrapment and rejecting the defense); Lowe v. State, 44 Fla. 449, 32 So.
956 (1902) (rejecting the defense); Pigg v. State, 43 Tex. io8 (875) (jury instruction in language of entrapment; conviction reversed on other grounds).
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the would-be thief initiates the plan. 7 Admittedly, entrapment
might be a factor in some extreme cases of overbearing inducement."' The more interesting precedents are those that acknowledge that the issue is not the defendant's voluntariness or culpability, but nonetheless struggle with an intuition that something
is awry when the crime is acted out on a stage manipulated by
the owner of the goods.
To express their intuition that something is amiss, the courts
stress the absence of a "trespass" in the staged taking. To understand why "trespass" looms so large in these cases, we shall have
to wind our way through a complicated series of doctrinal arguments. The thesis that will emerge is that the nearly appropriate
doctrinal gambits in these cases are but a vehicle for expressing
the ongoing influence of the principle that nonmanifest takings
should not be punished under the criminal law. The challenge in
developing this thesis will be to explain the principle of manifest
criminality surviving in cases of staged larceny, but not in other
areas of the modern common law. The quest for this explanation
will require us to probe the link between manifest criminality
and the theory of crime as a socially disturbing event.
To analyze the doctrinal rationalia for these decisions, we
shall concentrate on the well-reasoned opinion in Topolewski v.
State, 9 decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 19o6. The
facts richly illustrate the typical pattern in cases of staged larceny. In an effort to acquire meat products from a packing company, Topolewski sought the cooperation of one Dolan, recently
employed by the company and personally indebted to him. Dolan
informed the manager of the company of Topolewski's criminal
intentions. The manager instructed Dolan to feign cooperation,
which he did, in meeting repeatedly with Topolewski. The plan
that emerged was that Dolan would arrange to have four barrels
of meat placed on the loading dock of the plant and Topolewski
would be identified as the party to whom they were consigned.
Topolewski arrived in his own truck and, acting like any other
customer, he loaded the barrels in his truck and drove off. Though
the platform boss apparently did not know of the trap, the com87 See, e.g., People v. Rollino, 37 Misc. 2d 14, 233 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup,

Ct.

z962); Rex v. Turvey, [1946] 2 All E.R. 6o (Crim. App.).
8
A good example is Love v. People, 16o Ill. 501, 43 N.E. 71o (1896), in which
a hired detective had repeatedly plied the defendants with liquor and proposed
they together commit a series of burglaries. When the defendants were intoxicated,
the detective led them through a burglary that had been arranged in advance
with the owner who had hired him. The reversal in this case was rendered easier
because tlhe conviction was for burglary rather than larceny. See pp. 495-96 infra.
89 X30 Wis. 244, I09 N.W. 1037 (19O6).
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pany manager had set a watch over the barrels. Topolewski was
presumably arrested shortly after he drove offY0
In reversing Topolewski's conviction, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court carefully separated out matters that were not in dispute.
There was no question about Topolewski's intention to steal the
barrels of meat.91 Nor was there any dispute about whether entrapment provided a rationale for reversing the conviction. The
court specifically says that it is wrong to justify reversals in this
sort of case on the ground that the owner's deception excused the
would-be criminal, or, alternatively, that the owner's improper
behavior should preclude a criminal prosecution. 2 The proposition recurs repeatedly in the opinion that regardless of the actor's
criminal intent there could be no conviction unless his conduct
satisfied the objective elements in larceny. The central objective
requirement was a trespass. All of the court's -doctrinal arguments were designed to prove that the taking of the barrels with
93
the intent to steal was not sufficient to constitute a trespass.
Three subsidiary arguments emerge to demonstrate the absence of a trespassory taking: first, that the conduct of the
manager and the platform boss meant that the company had
"consented" to the taking; 94 second, that the transaction at the
loading dock amounted to a delivery; 9 5 and third, that the company had gone too far in facilitating Topolewski's taking of the
barrels. 0 Though popular in this line of cases, none of these three
arguments provides an adequate ground for reversal.
The doctrine of consent does not fit the facts. At the most
there was (i) consent for the purpose of apprehending the suspect and (2) an appearance of consent to passersby. If actual
consent precludes harm and therefore criminal liability,97 giving
"oSee id. at 246-47, io9 N.W. at 1038.
id. at 247, io9 N.W. at 1o38.

o" See

2 See id. at 255, tog N.W. at io41 ("Some writers .

.

. give .

.

. much atten-

tion to condemning the deception practiced to facilitate and encourage the commission of a crime . . . as if the deception were sufficient to excuse the would-be
criminal . . . and that the wrongful participation of the owner of the property
renders him and the public incapable of being heard to charge the person he has
entrapped with the offense of larceny. That is wrong.") (emphasis added). It
should be noted, however, that in other passages, the court stresses the element
of the company's inducement in bringing about the incident. See id. at 253, 25556, io9 N.W. at 2040, 1041.

" The issue of trespass is the refrain of the opinion. See id. at 250, 252, 254,
255, 256, 2o9 N.W. at xo39, 1040, 1041.
"4 See id. at 25X-55, io9 N.W. at io39-4i.

" See id.
" See id. at 255-57, io9 N.W. at 1041.

9" There is an additional problem whether "actual" consent should constitute
a defense if the actor believes he is acting without consent. The theoretical aspects
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consent for the purposes of a trap the same effect would clearly
go too far. It would suggest that any trap, any standing-by and
observing the thief perform the deed, would constitute "consent"
and preclude a conviction. Yet as evidenced by its treatment of
acceptable instances of staged larceny, the court was obviously
not inclined to go that far.18 The appearance of consent raises
another set of problems, for Topolewski indisputably assumed
that he was taking the barrels contrary to the owner's will. Is it
sensible to speak of apparent, uncommunicated consent as a defense? Apparent consent makes sense as a defense only if the
defendant reasonably believes that the owner has consented. Yet
on the facts of the case, Topolewski was unequivocably culpable
in executing his criminal plan. As a result, one is at a loss to see
why the appearance of consent should generate a defense on his
behalf. 99
The doctrine of "delivery" appears to add little to the discussion of consent. °0 Yet there was method in the court's
maintaining that a delivery precluded a finding of trespass in
the taking, for the process of receiving an object by delivery is
conceptually linked with the phenomenon of a non-incriminating
taking. If A voluntarily transfers an object to B, it is in the
nature of the transaction that the taking is not manifestly criminal. Thus one way for courts to express an intuition that an
unincriminated taking is not criminal is to affix the label "delivery." Saying that there is a "delivery" is a way of formalizing
one's sense that in the situation of the taking, the defendant did
not act manifestly like a thief. 10 1
of this issue are explored in Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A
Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 293, 300-04 ('975).
" The court accepts the result in cases like The King v. Egginton, x68 Eng.
Rep. 555 (i8oi), where the requisite "trespass" appears despite the staging of
the offense. See 130 Wis. at 251-52, 1O9 N.W. at io39-4o.
" Some comparative authority for this conclusion may be found in a case of
staged larceny that came before the German Supreme Court in 1953. A police
woman, apparently dressed in plain clothes, left her purse exposed in an effort to
tempt a suspected thief. The suspect took it and was convicted of larceny. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that at most he could be convicted of attempted
larceny. See Judgment of April 3o, 1953, 4 BGHSt. 199. The rationale was that
in the case of a trap such as this, the would-be thief did not actually acquire
possession. The court rejected the relevance of consent on the ground that "the
actor knew nothing," id. at 200, of the alleged consent and "assumed under the
circumstances that his act was consummated larceny," id.
10o The concept of delivery is introduced in the discussion of Regina v. Lawrance, 4 Cox Crim. Cas. 438, 440 (185o), which is cited as a case illustrating the
line between consent and nonconsent, see 130 Wis. at 251, 5o9 N.W. at 5o39.
'01 It is instructive that the court never says outright that the defendant delivered the barrels to the accused. It says that the conduct amounted "practically"
to a delivery, 130 Wis. at 251, io9 N.W. at i039, or that the victim "substantially

1976]

METAMORPHOSIS OF LARCENY

That the term "delivery" relates in this way to intuitions of
manifest criminality becomes evident when one compares cases
of staged larceny where the courts are willing to convict. A good
example is The King v. Egginton'0 2 where a servant, a putative
accomplice, let a band of thieves into his master's house. He
stood by as the thieves broke into a large desk and took silver
ingots. Though the servant was acting under his master's instructions and though the thieves could not have reached the
ingots without the servant's aid, a majority of judges perceived
the taking to be trespassory. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
endorsed this decision as an illustration of the "trespass" that was
missing in Topolewski. 0 3 The labels used to express the difference between the two cases are that in Egginton there was no
consent and no delivery, but in Topolewski there was. It is hard
to know what one means by these terms unless they express the
perception that in Egginton, the servant's participation did not
undercut the objective manifestation of thievery. 104 In Topolewski, however, dissembled cooperation converted the taking into
one that appeared to be in the ordinary course of business and
that was enough to warrant the conclusion that the barrels were
delivered to the defendant.
After its opening discussion of consent and delivery and the
setting up of Egginton as the counterpoint to the facts before it,
the court's opinion seeks to develop a systematic account of the
difference between permissible and impermissible traps. The general claim is that undue facilitation of the crime undermines the
element of trespass. The servant in Egginton had not unduly
facilitated the theft; but Dolan and the company manager had.10 5
Undue facilitation occurs when the owner does "acts amounting
to the constituents of the crime" ' or does "some act in the transaction essential to the offense." ' This language evokes association with a well-established rationale for denying criminal liability
made such delivery," id. at 254, log N.W. at 1040, or that "the property was in
practical effect delivered to the would-be thief," id. at 256, io9 N.W. at 1041. This
phrasing is a good clue that even Justice Marshall, who wrote for the court, regarded the doctrine of delivery as but an approximation of a deeper issue.
102 168 Eng. Rep. 555 (18oi).
103 130 Wis. at 251-52, lOg N.W. at 1o39-4o.
104 The critical fact in Egginton was apparently that the servant merely stood
by and let the thieves carry out their plan. See Rex v. Turvey, [19461 2 All E.R.
6o (Crim. App.); Regina v. Lawrance, 4 Cox Crim. Cas. 438, 440 (185o) (directing acquittal if the servant handed the would-be thief a deed, but suggesting that
conviction would be permissible if the servant laid the deed down on a table and
let the would-be thief pick it up).
'0 See 130 Wis. at 256-57, io9 N.W. at 1041.
100 Id. at 252, 2o9 N.W. at 1040.
17Id. at 254, 1o9 N.W. at 1040.
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in burglary cases. Suppose one night Dolan, the would-be accomplice, had met Topolewski outside the plant in pursuit of a plan to
obtain the barrels by burglary. While the latter kept watch, Dolan climbed through a window, which he and the manager had
arranged to leave open. It is well-recognized that the pseudoburglary by Dolan could not be imputed to Topolewski.' 08 In
speaking of the owner's doing the acts "essential to the crime,"
the court apparently sought to assimilate Topolewski to this type
of case. Yet the meaning of "essential act" is different in the
staging at the company's loading dock. Neither Dolan nor the
company manager committed the trespass, as the would-be accomplice performed the act of breaking-and-entering by climbing
through the window.
What the Wisconsin court had in mind was that the "design
to trap a criminal" went a little too far because the company's
facilitation prevented "the taking of the property from being
characterized by an element of trespass." ' The reference to
"essential acts" helps us little in understanding why the "design
. . went
v a little too far." 110 The "essential act" wanting is the
trespass and "trespass" in the context of larceny is not an act
in the ordinary sense. It is a quality or an attribute of taking
property. The difference between a trespass and a mere taking
lies in the manner of acquisition. A trespass has to evoke associations with the ancient form of taking vi et armis. Thus the
focus on undue facilitation and essential acts leads us back to the
principle of manifest criminality. The undue facilitation eliminated the quality of trespass by converting the thieving into a
taking in the ordinary course of business."'
The important point to be drawn from Topolewski is that the
principle of manifest criminality can still influence the outcome
of larceny prosecutions." 2 The intuitions that inform the rule of
108

See State v. Hayes, io5 Mo. 76, 16 S.W. 514 (1891)

(burglary conviction

reversed where the feigned accomplice was the only party to enter the building).
lo 130 Wis. at 254, 109 N W. at 1040.
"O Id., lOg N.W. at lo4O.
...The close tie between the concept of trespass and the principle of manifest
criminality influences the language of the opinion in People v. Rollino, 37 Misc. 2d
14, 233 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1962). The court concedes that a "trespass" is no
longer required under New York law, id. at 20, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 586, but then
finds it necessary to reintroduce the concept of trespass in order to express its
conclusion that there is no liability for larceny where the "owner or his authorized
agent voluntarily consents to the taking . . . only for the purpose of catching the
thief . . . ," id. at 21, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
112 For more recent examples of reversal in cases of staged larceny, see People
v. Rollino, 37 Misc. 2d 14, 233 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1962) and Rex v. Turvey,
[19461 2 All E.R. 6o (Ct. Crim. App.). However, the principle underlying the
defense has also been rejected. See United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 90-92
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"breaking bulk" and that shape the concept of possession survived the metamorphosis of larceny that began late in the eighteenth century. Yet the shared image of the thief continues to
affect the course of the law in but this remote corner of criminal
prosecutions." 3 The exclusive survival of manifest criminality in
the context of staged larceny suggests that there is a deeper connection between the common law concept of criminality and the
practice of designing a trap for a would-be thief. Topolewski
invites us to consider what that deeper connection might be.
While we can grasp the concept of manifest larceny there is

another element in the classical concept of criminality that is far
more elusive. This additional element is expressed by describing

crime as a breach of the peace or a socially disturbing event." 4
An act of larceny is a frightening and unnerving episode in com-

munal life. Yet this account of criminality is problematic, for
larceny is not disturbing every time it occurs. The thief might

work in secret with no one present. In what sense is that actually unnerving? What one has to say is that thieving is typically

or paradigmatically disturbing; and in any event, the thought or
anticipation of falling prey to thieves is always disturbing. This
(3d Cir. 1973) (treating the actor's intent as the controlling issue); Smith v.
United States, 291 F.2d 220, 221 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 834 (i96i).
1"' Other efforts to keep the principle of manifest criminality alive have foundered. The proposition is occasionally advanced that "where the taking is open
and there is no subsequent attempt to conceal the property, . . . a strong presumption arises that there was no felonious intent." Kemp v. State, 146 Fla. xox,
104, 200 So. 368, 369 (1941). But see Pennsylvania v. Becomb, Addison 386, 388
(Pa. County Ct. 5th Cir. 1799) (defendants argued, unsuccessfully, that they
should not be guilty of larceny in taking skins owned by Indians because, counsel
submitted, the taking was "in open day and avowed"). The United States Supreme
Court explicitly disapproved this presumption in Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 275 (1952).
11 The concept of the socially disturbing event has received its most careful
elaboration in the field of criminal attempts. According to Jescheck, acts constitute criminal attempts if "the faith of the community in the legal order is
thereby shaken and the sense of security under the law could thereby be compromised." H. JEsCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRA=CHTS 341 (1969). It is important
to distinguish two different ways in which the "faith of the community in the
legal order" might be undermined: (i) by the act itself, or (2) by the failure to
prosecute and punish the culprit for an act that has evoked the community's
concern. Though the text refers to the first of these alternatives, Jescheck recognizes the second as a permissible interpretation of the theory. See id. at 352.
Another author takes the idea of the socially disturbing event, presumably limited
to the first interpretation, to be a basis for deducing the requirement of manifest
criminality. See Meyer, Kritik an der Neuregelung der Versuchsstrajbarkeit, 87

ZEIrscHarFr :Uit DIE GEsAxTE Sn

REcHTSwsSSENscuAFT 598, 611

(1975).

The

theory of crime as a socially disturbing event has not received much attention in
the English-language literature; for one treatment see Becker, Criminal Attempt
and the Theory of the Law of Crimes, 3 PHM. & PUB. Apr. 262 (X974).
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aspect of larceny may indeed be essential to the common law
conceptualization of larceny as a public rather than a private
harm.
If we think of larceny as a socially disturbing event, we might
be able to fathom why modern courts are disposed to acquit
only in a subset of cases in which the actor's conduct fails to
conform with the shared image of the thief."' In cases like
Topolewski, the additional element of criminality is also wanting.
There is nothing unnerving about Topolewski's falling into a
rehearsed scene of larceny. Yet owners of goods are obviously
disturbed by thieves who manage to improvise a manner of
taking that looks perfectly innocent. This would explain why
modern courts would convict in the latter cases of non-manifest
larceny but balk at convicting in cases of staged larceny. At
earlier periods of history there may have been a closer conceptual tie between manifest larceny and socially unnerving
conduct. That tie has come unraveled in modern jurisprudence
and now it might take the absence of both manifest criminality
and socially unnerving conduct to create a convincing case for
acquitting a would-be thief.
D. Objective Criminality Over Time
Whether the principle of objective criminality can survive
even in its truncated form in the modern law of larceny depends
largely on whether the doctrine can be articulated in a manner
that makes sense to the critical modern observer. It is important
for us to attempt an exposition of the principle, if only to help
us understand why it appealed so powerfully to lawyers prior
to the end of the eighteenth century.
There is one aspect of the principle that might confound
even its most sympathetic critic. It was assumed at common
law that the criminality of the deed had to become manifest in a
single brief moment of force or stealth. The carrier committed
larceny if he broke bulk, but not if he took the entire bale and
retained it in his possession.", Topolewski was not guilty because his driving away with the barrels was indistinguishable
from other pick-ups occurring in the ordinary course of business."' Yet if we had observed Topolewski from the moment
115
To show the limited nature of the survival, suppose Dolan and Topolewski
had actually conspired to steal the barrels of meat and the taking of the barrels
had transpired precisely as it did. The appearance of criminality would be exactly
the same, yet without the element of staging there is no doubt that both Topolewski and Dolan would have been guilty.
1i6 See pp. 484-86 supra.
7
See p. 496 supra.
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of his initial contact with Dolan, we surely would have enough
objective evidence to infer the criminality of his plan. How
can one justify limiting the inquiry in-to objective criminality to
the moment the suspect lays his hands on the goods?
The origin of this implicit restriction on objective criminality
is presumably the private execution of manifest thieves in ancient
legal systems." 8 Thieves were identified as manifest if their
thievery was public and potentially visible to all. Conduct could
not be visible to all if the inference of criminality derived from
observations extending over time. Conduct like Topolewski's
would appear objectively criminal only to someone who followed
him about and became a party to his private conversations. If
we recall the origins of the common law in the private execution
of manifest thieves, it is not puzzling that we should insist on
larcenous conduct peaking in a single moment of stealth or force.
Of course, we might properly question whether the common
law should adhere to a principle of publicity which developed
under the special conditions of ancient legal systems. Yet this
premise of the common law cannot be assessed in isolation from
other structural principles of the criminal law as we know it.
One of these assumptions is that crimes occur at an identifiable
moment of time. One could certainly imagine a theory of criminal
law that ignored this premise, but so far as one can tell, no
Western legal system does. The assumption that crimes occur
at a single instant of time generates the further proposition that
there must be a union of act and intent at the moment the crime
occurs." 0 The required union of act and intent is in turn a
logical prerequisite of possessorial immunity. If one could
acquire possession in one moment and intend to steal at another,
20
no principle of possessorial immunity would be possible.
1"'
119

See pp. 76-77 supra.
The pervasive influence of the principle is expressed in the extraordinary

attention paid to the one case that appears to be an exception, namely the situation in which A attempts to kill B and fails, but thinking B dead, decapitates the
body or otherwise causes death. The first act is at most an attempt; the second
lacks an intent to kill. Nonetheless, the clear tendency is to impose liability in
this situation. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky. 239, 38 S.W. 422
(1896), rehearing denied, 1OO Ky. 268, 38 S.W. 1081 (1897); Judgment of April
26, ig6o, 14 BGHSt. 193. For critical discussion, see J. HALL, GENERAL PRIMCIPLES
or CmuNAL. LAW 289 (2d ed. 196o); LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note I, at 241-42;

G.

WILLIA

s, CRI

SCHOENxE & H.

NAL LAW:

THE GENERAL PART 173-75

SCHROEDER, supra note 17, at 507-o8;

(2d ed. 1961);

A.

Mayer, Das Problem des

sogenannten dolts generalis, II JURISTEN ZEITUNG 109 (1956).
120 Coke invokes the classic principle actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea
partly to express the principle that, if one forms the intent to steal after acquiring
possession, one cannot be guilty of larceny. E. COKE, supra note 12, at *207; cf.
L. LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 243 (stressing the requirement of simultaneity as
a structural feature of theft offenses).
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If one accepts the premise that crimes must occur at a single
moment of time, then it is hard to see how the principle of
objective criminality could apply to a series of acts over time.
The only relevant act is the one that occurs simultaneously with
the intent to steal.'' Now one might say that any act should
be sufficient for this purpose, but this position would be
fundamentally inconsistent with the notion that crimes occur at
a unique point in time. Further, selecting an act arbitrarily
would violate our sense that the act defining the crime must be
one that is characteristically disturbing to the community. Thus
the principle of manifest criminality, the required union of act
and intent, and the premise that acts occur at a single moment
of time are all facets of one underlying conception of criminal
conduct.
There is no doubt that one could challenge the soundness of
this traditional approach to criminality. The metamorphosis of
larceny, to which we are about to turn, is precisely a sustained
reaction against the limitations implicit in the principle of
manifest criminality. Though the modern approach to larceny
nominally subscribes to the required union of act and intent at
a single moment of time, the act required proves to be any act
of dishonest acquisition. Thus the modern approach accommodates the range of objective evidence obtained by scrutinizing
Topolewski's conduct over a span of time. The relevance of this
evidence is not that it provides proof of objectively criminal
conduct, but rather that it tends to establish the required intent
at the moment of acquisition.
In the conclusion of this essay I shall attempt to show that
the limitations implicit in the traditional approach to larceny
expressed an important value of respect for individual privacy. 2"
121

There are some deeper, unanalyzed, issues in this argument. For example,

the argument assumes that one has an intent to steal at a particular moment of
time, and therefore, that the act manifesting this intent must also occur at a
particular moment. Yet why not suppose that the intent occurs over a prolonged
period, with the acts manifesting this intent extending over the same range of
time? Topolewski, for example, planned his scheme for at least several days, and
planning is arguably a sort of intending.
I am inclined to think that intending is significantly different from planning.
The distinction is evidenced by the odd ring to: "Topolewski intended his crime
for several days" (compare: "he has been willing his crime for several days"),
The difference between intending and planning may be like the difference between
looking and seeing; one can look at something for hours, but it is not grammatically appropriate to say: "I have seen it for hours." These are but suggestions
for a theory of intending that would be relevant to criminal theory. The concept
has already drawn a rich philosophical literature. See, e.g., J. MEILAND, TnE
NATURE OF INTENTION (ig7o); G. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (2d ed. 1966).
121See pp. 525-28 infra. The argument in the conclusion will not dispose

METAMORPHOSIS OF LARCENY

1976]

Privacy was assured by restricting the scope of evidence relative
to proving that the defendant was a thief. The primary restriction implicit in this approach was that the crime could not be
established by surveying the defendant's behavior over a span
of time. Its central tenets were that crime occurred at a single

moment of time, that the criminality had to be manifest at that
moment, and that the manifestation of crime was typically un-

nerving to the community.
III.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE METAMORPHOSIS

The modern as well as the traditional approach to larceny
insists upon intent as a necessary element of liability. Yet the
role of animus furandi within the traditional conception of the
crime was different from intention in the modern approach. The
animus became an issue only if the state could prove an objectively
criminal act. The defendant advanced the absence of animus
furandi as a way of challenging the authenticity of appearances.
One might look like a felon without being one, and the reason
would be that one lacked the necessary animus furandi. The
two-stage ordering of the inquiry into criminal guilt relegated the
issue of intention to a subsidiary status. Indeed, it was difficult
to disengage the animus from a manifestly criminal act and treat
123
it as an abstract issue as we are wont to do today.
of all possible alternatives to the principle of manifest criminality. For example,
one might imagine a system of objective criminality extending over a series of
acts, with the required intent occurring at the time of any one of them. The
series of acts, taken together, would provide presumptive evidence of a criminal intent and thus avoid the dangers of relying on character evidence and
confessions. It is fair to say that this article is directed primarily to the relative
merits of the traditional and modern systems and does not consider all possible
variations on the criteria of liability.
122 Intent, it should be noted, was not completely devoid of independent
significance. One area in which the defendant's subjective state provided a
rationale for conviction was the set of cases in which the defendant fraudulently
invoked the legal process in order to acquire the victim's goods. These were
called cases of larceny in fraudem legis. See E. COKE, supra note 12, at *1o8;
i M. HALE, supra note 12, at 5o7. The leading case is Farr's (Farre's) Case, reportedly tried at Old Bailey in April, 1665. See 84 Eng. Rep. 1074 (i665).
According to the facts found at trial, Farre and his mistress Chadwick fraudulently brought a writ of ejectment against Mrs. Stanyer (Steneer). Having
had her ejected and arrested, they then rifled her house, breaking open cup
boards and trunks, and carried off a variety of valuable goods. The defendants
were convicted of larceny and executed. John Kelyng apparently sat as a judge
in this trial and provides us with one report. Id. Sir Thomas Raymond was
counsel and gives his version in his report of Chisser. See 83 Eng. Rep. 142,
142 (1678). The case is also discussed at 2 E. EAST, supra note 7o, at 66o.
One could interpret Farr's Case as one in which the acts of taking were manifestly criminal and the only issue was whether the defendants could rely on
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For modern lawyers, this structure of inquiry is reversed.
Intent is the primary issue in prosecuting larceny, at least where

the requisite harm has been established; the acts are subsidiary
and function as one of the several means of proving intent. At

the risk of some oversimplification we could say that the essential
difference between the traditional and modern approaches is that

the former was oriented toward the actus reus, while the latter is
oriented toward the mens rea. The critical question at this point
is: How did this radical reorientation come to pass?
A. The Withering of Manifest Criminality
The metamorphosis of larceny began in the intellectual ferment of the late eighteenth century. The times were astir with
a new, rationalist and instrumentalist social criticism, and many
thinkers, above all Beccaria and Bentham, were attempting to
apply this new social criticism to the use of criminal sanctions.'2 4
Punishing the guilty was not an end in itself, they held, but a
means of protecting society and promoting human happinessY.2
No form of punishment could be justified unless it was the
cheapest available means for serving these social ends. 2 6
The criminal sanction could serve as a means of social proa fraudulently acquired writ of ejectment as a defense. On this view the issue
of fraud served to deprive the defendants of a defense, not to ground a conviction. However, in cases of burglary, fraudulently acquired entries are called
in fraudem legis and treated as the equivalent of a forcible entry. See Le Mott's
Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1073 (1665); E. COKE, supra note 12, at *64 (proposing a
hypothetical case of fraudulently inducing a constable to open someone else's
door); I M. HALE, supra note 12, at 552 (relying on Coke's hypothetical); i W.
HAwKINs, supra note 59, at i61 (broadening the rule to encompass all fraudulent
entry).
124 See C. BECCARIA, ON CRIeS AND PUNISHMENTS (Bobbs-Merrill 1963)
(first published in 1764); J. BENTHAi,, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MoRALS AND LEGISLATION (1823 ed.) (first published in 1789). Beccaria selfconsciously sought to apply the "enlightment" of his century to the study of
crime and punishment. See C. BECCARIA, supra at 8-9. In his lectures on law,
delivered at the University of Pennsylvania in 1790-91, James Wilson noted the
importance and sweep of the investigation into the theory of criminal law
prompted by Beccaria's work. See 2 J. WILSON, WORKS 615-16 (McCloskey ed.
1967).
2'See
C. BECCARiA, supra note 124, at 8; J. BENTHAM, supra note 124, at 70,
170-71; 2 IV. PALEY, supra note 8o, at 46-47, 370-71 (1825) (first published in
1785) ; 2 J. WILSON, supra note 124, at 611. On this point Blackstone concurred,
see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *I-12; the susceptibility of a writer
in the tradition of the common law commentators to the arguments of the new
theorists is suggestive of the influence on the law that the new theories must have
had. 2 6
1 See C. BECCARIA, supra note 124, at 12-13; J. BENTHAm, supra note 124, at

1976]

METAMORPHOSIS OF LARCENY

tection only if the law identified particular social interests worthy
of protection and took the necessary measures to protect these
interests. 12 7 The focus on the interests protected by the criminal
law led to the conceptualization of larceny as a crime against
property. 2 8 The criminal, it turned out, was rational like the
rest of us; he sought wealth and would steal so long as the
benefit of theft outweighed the cost of prospective punishment.'29
The analysis of the criminal law into specific interests and the
conceptualization of crime as an intrusion against those interests
provided the conceptual background for the emerging school of
protectionist criminology. At a single stroke, this view of crime
generated a theory of criminal motivation and enabled legislators
to calculate a rational response to crime by measuring the punishment against the social interest at stake and the strength of the
motive inducing criminal behavior.
If the function of the criminal law was to protect social interest, it seemed pointless for the police and the courts to stay
their hand until damage occurred. The most socially protective
measure was to intervene prior to the occurrence of harm.'
Thus the late eighteenth century witnessed the first cases recognizing the doctrine of criminal attempts.' 3' The advantage of
earlier intervention would prove to be one of the major determinants of the metamorphosis of larceny.
Another major influence of the period was the quest for welldefined, rationally consistent rules of criminal liability. Theorists
like Montesquieu, Beccaria and Bentham insisted on clear and
definite rules as the foundation for a rational system of laws
that would provide a well-tooled mechanism for deterring crim12" See, e.g., C. BECCARIA, supra note 124, at 64-65;

8o, at 46-47.
128 See, e.g., C. BECCARIA, supra note 124, at 66, 74;

2 W. PALEY, supra note

J. BENTHAM, supra note

124, at 25o-51; 2 J. WllsoN, supra note 124, at 639.
12 See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, supra note 124, at 179.
1
. The eighteenth century theorists of criminal law heavily emphasized prevention, see, e.g., C. BECCARIA, supra note 124, at 93, since both the evil of the offense
and the evil of punishment can be avoided thereby. Blackstone relied on the
sentiment that "preventive justice is .. . preferable in all respects to punishing
justice," 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *251, in praising the English system
of requiring those who gave just ground of apprehension of future misbehavior
to find pledges and securities for keeping the peace, id. at *251-52.
121 The formal doctrine of criminal attempts stems from Rex v. Higgins, 102
Eng. Rep. 269 (18oi) (defendant indicted and convicted for "soliciting" a servant to commit larceny) and Rex. v. Scofield, Cald. 397 (1784) (2786 ed.)
(defendant convicted, though he had not completed plan to commit arson). Of
course, the late emergence of the formal doctrine of attempt does not mean that
other means were not available for official intervention against potentially criminal
conduct. See generally LAFAVE & Scor, supra note i, at 423-24; J. HAL., supra
note izg, at 558-74.
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inal conduct.' 32 These ideas were to come to fruition in the
early nineteenth century, which in virtually all Western legal
systems was a period of intense legislative activity. Legislation
imposes demands of generality, definition, and consistency that
are hardly satisfied by appeals to a shared image of thievery.
The first parliamentary report on the criminal law, published in
1834, takes the law of larceny to be the best illustration of the
newly felt chaos of the common law rules.'33 If the criminal law
was to come under legislative countrol, it seemed that there would
have to be a new methodology for identifying criminal conduct.
At the same time that the eighteenth century penal theorists
were laying the foundations of the modern theory of social control, the judges of the time were beginning to adjust the traditional rules of larceny in ways that would eventually bring the
law into line with the values of the time. At the early stages of
the metamorphosis of larceny, the issues appeared to be technical
and of marginal significance. A good example is the famous case
of The King v. Pear,' which has come to be seen as the source
of the crime of "larceny by trick." ' The case raised the recurrent eighteenth century phenomenon of theft by someone in
nominal possession of a hired chattel. 3 Pear had rented a horse
from one Finch; he said he was going to ride to Surrey; in fact
he rode to Smithfield and sold the horse. It appeared also that
he lied about his residence. 37 In Pear's trial for larceny, the
barrier to conviction was that he had acquired the horse by
delivery from Finch and thus presumably had acquired possession. There was no "breaking of bulk," and therefore the case
did not come under the limited exception of The Carrier'sCase.
The problem was an old one: Is an intent to steal sufficient
to override the immunity provided by acquiring possession? The
132See I

MONTESQUIE',

THE SPIRiT OF THE LAWS 75

(Hafner 1949); C.

BECCARTA, supra note 124, at 94-95; J. BENTHAM, supra note 124, at 173.
133 See First Report, supra note 4, at 4-9.
134

i68 Eng. Rep. 208 (i779).

There appears to be little recognition in the

early nineteenth century literature that Pear was a major event in the history
of larceny. (East and Russell recognized that Pear was widely discussed, but
accorded it a position not significantly different from several other cases at the
time). See 2 E. EAST, supra note 70, at 685-698; 2 W. RUSSELL, CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS i08-83 (1819).
Commentators of this century have canonized
the case. See, in particular, Beale, supra note 4, at 248-56 (criticizing the case as
intruding on the domain properly reserved for the crime of false pretenses). See
generally J. HALL, supra note 4, at 40-45.
13' The origin of the expression "larceny by trick" is obscure. Hall uses it,
see J. HALL, supra note 4, at 4o, but it is not to be found in Beale, supra note 4,
or in 2 J. BIsHoP, supra note 6o, at 451-52 (section discussing Pear).
'e See cases discussed in note 138 infra.
137 68 Eng. Rep. at 209.
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traditional answer, as we have seen, was always negative. Yet
Pear was an especially appealing case for moving the law in a
new direction. True, Pear's dishonesty did not peak in a moment
of manifest thievery. But when there are objective data as incriminating as Pear's lie about his address and his subsequent
selling of the horse, why should one insist upon so narrow a view
of what it is to act like a thief?
Presumably influenced by reasoning of this sort, Justice
Ashhurst instructed the jury that if Pear had the intention of
selling the horse at the time he mounted it and rode off, he was
guilty of larceny,' but if he formed the intent later, he was
not guilty.' 3 Pear's subsequent conviction generated controversy
among the judges. They met several months later and the
majority of them confirmed Ashhurst's instructions as sound. If
Pear's intention was fraudulent 4 o at the outset, they reasoned,
he never acquired legal possession. Thus, conversion of the horse
(presumably at some moment on the ride to Smithfield or at the
time of the sale) became equivalent to the taking and carrying
away characteristic of common law larceny.'
138

i68 Eng. Rep. at 208. Justice Ashhurst noted that Pear was not akin to

cases where according to the original agreement, the bailment was circumscribed
in time or in the number of miles that could be ridden. Id. In those cases, when
the rider exceeded the number of hours or miles permitted, his possession lapsed
and his taking was larceny. The leading precedent for this rule is the conviction
of John Tunnard at Old Bailey, 1729. See id. at 209, note (a). Tunnard borrowed
a horse to ride three miles, but rode to London and sold it. He was convicted.
The reported rationale was that after he exceeded the agreed-upon limit, his
privity lapsed and his taking was felony. That theory did not apply in Pear, for
Pear sold the horse on the same day and apparently did not breach any welldefined limit as to time or distance.
1o x68 Eng. Rep. at 209.
140 It is important to distinguish between a "fraudulent intent" and anirnus
jurandi. The former, but not the latter, would be satisfied by an intent to take
temporarily. See State v. Coombs, 55 Me. 47 (i867) (interpreting the rule to
require merely a fraudulent or tortious taking). On this view, the relevant
moment for the animus furandi is the subsequent conversion, not the initial
acquisition of the chattel.
141 The requirement of a conversion led to some acquittals and appellate
reversals. See, e.g., Regina v. Brooks, 173 Eng. Rep. 5oi (837) (offering a hired
horse for sale insufficient to constitute a conversion); Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. L.R. 96, 89 S.W. 16o (i9o5) (no conversion of hired horse and
buggy if defendant pledged it with the intent to redeem it). The occurrence of
the crime at the moment of conversion suggests that Pear stands for an offense
more like embezzlement than larceny. If Parliament had legislated in the field
of breaches of trust by 1779, rather than beginning in 1799, there would have
been no need for a special crime of "larceny by trick." Thinking of Pear and
"larceny by trick" as an anticipatory form of embezzlement explains why Western
European legal systems have well-defined crimes corresponding to larceny (Dieb-

stahl, vol, krazha), embezzlement (Unterschlagung, abus de confiance, prisvoenie),
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The interpretation of Pear has generated considerable controversy, largely because there are two published versions of
the judge's opinion. The first report, published in 1789, holds
that the crime occurred at the time of the subsequent conversion, and not when Pear first mounted and rode off.'" 2 A
second version of the opinion, published in East's Pleas of the
Crown in I803, has the judges saying that the crime occurred
at the moment of riding off, which presumably implied that no
subsequent conversion was necessary. 143 The latter view was
rejected by the Parliamentary report of i834,144 which presumably relied upon the first-published opinion in the case.
Others who have studied the case have also taken the 1789
opinion as authoritative.'4 5 Yet East's opinion, as we shall see,
and false pretenses (Betrug, escroquerie, obman), but there is no concept in
German, French or Soviet law corresponding to "larceny by trick."
142 This is the report of the case reprinted at i68 Eng. Rep. 208, initially published in I Leach 213 (1779 ed.). This volume of Leach's Reports contains several
other cases in which the judges, addressing themselves to Pear, suggested a reading that partially supports the version of the case that appears in 2 E. EAST, supra
note 7o, at 685-89. In The King v. Semple, i68 Eng. Rep. 312 (1785), the court
says first that the important part of the opinion in Pear was the holding that
possession remained in the owner after Pear initially rode off with the horse,
see id. at 313, yet it goes on to say that the issue of conversion is important only
because it bears on the intent in initially acquiring the horse, see id. at 314. In
The King v. Charlewood, 168 Eng. Rep. 306 (1786), Pear is interpreted to be
about "intent to steal" at the time of the initial acquisition; yet the focus of the
opinion is not on intent as opposed to conversion, but on whether the intent to
steal was formed simultaneously with the defendant's mounting of the horse. On
both interpretations of Pear, the accused would not be guilty if he first formed
a fraudulent intent after getting the horse. Prior to the publication of his first
volume of reports, Leach reviewed these cases in his annotation to Hawkins in
1787. He concluded that the correct reading was that fraud at the time of initial
acquisition prevented transfer of possession and thus made the subsequent conversion felonious. See I W. HAwKINs, supra note 78, at 135 n..
143 2 E. EAST, supra note 7o, at 685-89.
144 First Report, supra note 4, at 23.
145

See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note i, at 627 ("At all events, he must, in fact,
later convert it"); F. POLLACK & R. WRIGHT, supra note 78, at 219 ("The principle
. . . was once thought to be that the fraud prevented any divesting of the owner's
possession . . . .); 3 J. STEPHEit, supra note 4, at 16o ("the subsequent conversion [is regarded] as theft") ; Scourlock, supra note 4, at 21 (showing that in
Tunnard, the intent did not prevent transfer of possession; in Pear, it did);
Turner, Middleton's Case and the Larceny 'Act, xg6, 7 CAmB. L.J. 337, 339
(194i) (stating directly that Pear did not require the offender to have animus
furandi at the time of initial acquisition). There is, however, a minority view,
which appears to be less well-informed, holding that Pear should be read as a
case about animus furandi at the time of initial acquisition. See R. PERKINS,
supra note I, at 246; L. NVEINREB, supra note 6i, at 315; H. PACKER, LIITS OF
THE CRIIMAL SANCTION 82-83 (1968); Pearce, Theft by False Promises, ox
U. PA. L. REv. 967, 970-71 (1953).
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proved highly influential as an expression of nineteenth century
attitudes toward the concept of criminality.
It is important to see how these two versions of Pear affect
the determination of when the crime occurred and the moment
at which the criminal suspect could be properly arrested. According to East's report and interpretation of Pear, the critical fact
is the intent to steal at the moment of mounting the horse. A
subsequent conversion of the horse would not be required and
Pear presumably could have been arrested as soon as he left the
stable. It would also follow that Pear's lie would be an in-

cidental fact in the case. Under this view, a routine act like
mounting a horse would be criminal if the actor's mind was
visited by the wrong kind of intention. The more conservative
reading of the case retains the requirement of a muted manifesta-

tion of criminal intent at the time of conversion. Nevertheless,
even read conservatively, Pear was a major step in the transition

from the pattern of objective criminality to a pattern of larceny
by intent. Holding that fraud could defeat the transfer of posses-

sion meant that possessorial immunity could no longer be thought
of as an objective consequence of the voluntary delivery; henceforth, one would have to think of the rule as a form of protection
contingent on the intention and the desert of the recipient."4 6
Further subjectification of the law of larceny was invited by
the move to criminalize improper behavior by finders. According to the traditional texts, finders could not be guilty of

larceny. 1 7 The rationale, presumably, was that they did not
take from the possession of anyone

-

a lost object was one un-

46

' The problem in Pear would be solved today under German law by treat-

ing the misappropriation of the horse as embezzlement, see note 141 supra, or
as an instance of fraud (the German analogue of obtaining property by false
pretenses), see Judgment of January 16, x963, 1S BGHSt. 221. In this case, the
defendant acquired the use of another's car from a garage attendant on the
implicit misrepresentation that he was authorized to use the car. Id. at 222. The
German Supreme Court reversed the larceny conviction, holding that the crime
should have been classified as fraud under STGB § 263. Id. at 223. Although
the defendant did not acquire title when the attendant permitted him to use the
car, see note ii supra, the possessory interest acquired by deception was sufficient
to permit prosecution for fraud. Note that the English law of false pretenses
has been sufficiently relaxed to permit prosecution in cases like Pear and the
1963 German case. See Theft Act 1968, c. 6o, § i6; note 7 supra. Beale's criticism
of Pear was that it intruded improperly in the domain that should have been
regulated by the law of false pretenses. See Beale, supra note 4, at 253-56.
147 E. COKE, supra note 12, at *o7;

i M. HALE, supra note 12, at 5o6; i W.

HAwxmis, supra note 59, at 134; F. PollocK & R. WaIGHT, supra note 78, at
,72-8o. But note that the finding of treasure-trove (valuables found buried in the
earth) and the failure to turn the valuables over to the King subjected the finder
to a penalty of imprisonment for misprison. i W. BrAcxsTON, supra note 12, at
*295-96; 4 id.at *121.
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possessed. Alternatively, the finder's immunity may be explained
by the objectively ambiguous nature of taking an unpossessed
object, a taking not readily recognized as that of a manifest thief.
Yet the frontier between taking an unpossessed object and taking
from the possession of the owner was not one that could be staked
out by appealing to the image of the thief. There were too many
ambiguous cases, where possession dissolved into loss of control.
Consider the case that Hale devised: "A man hides a purse of
money in his corn-mow, his servant finding took part of it." I'l
Is this a taking from the owner's possession? To determine
whether the owner still has possession, one is pulled toward considering the owner's intention in laying down his purse. Yet if
one considers the owner's state of mind, why not also look to the
finder's understanding of the situation? Thus one is drawn to
construing the case as larceny or not, according as the finder
knows of the owner's point in putting the purse in the corn-mow.
Hale continues: "[I] f by circumstances it can appear that he
knew his master laid it there, it is felony." 149 Evidently, in
these cases in the borderland of possession, the principle of
objective criminality yielded to an inquiry about the special
knowledge of the taker, and even ambiguous takings, coupled
with an incriminating subjective state in the putative finder,
might well support convictions for larceny.
One of the reasons that finding is a special case is that the
finder's wrong typically has little to do with the act of acquiring
physical control over the object. His wrong is failing to take
proper steps to locate the owner and return the object. Picking
up a wallet lying in the middle of the street is a responsible act hardly a basis for a capital offense. Yet if the finder's behavior
should thereafter fall short of community expectations, one might
have a sound reason for blaming and punishing him as a criminal.
Though the two sets of problems were of a different order,
early nineteenth century commentators had little difficulty assimilating the case of finding and improper keeping to the cases
of forcible and other felonious takings. With little authority
other than Hale's comments in the late seventeenth century,9 0
x48
1 M. HALE, supra note

12, at 507.

149 Id.

The case that helped shape the new doctrine of larceny by finders was The
"Io
King v. Wynne, 168 Eng. Rep. 308 (1786), in which a coachman was convicted
of larceny for unwrapping a box that a passenger left behind and selling the
contents. The problem was that the defendant apparently obtained possession
without fraud on his part, id. at 309; therefore Pear would not apply. According to Leach, the trial judge instructed the jury that it was felony only if
the coachman "uncorded the box, not merely from natural though idle curiosity,
but with an intention to embezzle any part of its contents." Id. The holding
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East," ' Chitty,'52 and Russell,15 3 writing from 1803 to 1819,
developed the doctrine that a finder could be guilty of larceny
if he failed to exercise due care to locate the owner and return
the object. These facts occurring after the taking were assimilated
to the traditional analysis of larceny on the theory that they
tended to prove felonious intent at the time of the initial receipt.
This revision of the law of finder's liability for larceny was
part of a much broader reassessment of the entire common law
of larceny. The early nineteenth century writers were taking
another look at the rules of the common law and critical events
in its evolution, such as The Carrier's Case and Chisser. Instead of seeing defendants looking and acting manifestly like
thieves, what they found in the past was primarily an inquiry
about felonious intent.
Two of the particular rules that received reinterpretation
were the rules pertaining to temporary takings and takings under
a color of right. The traditional text writers concurred that in
the common law, as distinguished from Roman law, 54 a temporary taking was not felonious. As Blackstone put it, "if a
neighbor takes another's plow that is left in the field and uses it
upon his own land and then returns it . . . [cases like this] are

misdemeanors and trespasses but no felonies." "I When Archbold
returns to this hypothetical case in 1812, in the first edition of
his influential manual on criminal evidence, it is apparent to him
that the issue is not whether the goods are in fact returned, but
whether at the time of the taking there was an intent to return. 56
makes little sense except as an application of the principle of "breaking bulk."

The court did not treat the problem as an instance of liability of finders.
15 East discusses The King v. Wynne, 68 Eng. Rep. 3o8 (1786), as a finders
case and repeats Hale's example of the "purse-in-the-corn-mow," stressing that
even in that case the circumstances must be pregnant in order to establish the
finder's felonious intent. 2 E. EAST, supra note 7o, at 664.
1523

T.

CHiTTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRimiNAL LAW 920

(i8i6) (dis-

cussing Wynne as an example of liability by a finder).
15 Russell cites The King v. Wynne, 168 Eng. Rep. 308 (1786), as showing

"that the taking animo furandi of goods which have been found by the party
may amount to larceny."

2

W. RussELL, supra note 134, at

1042

(emphasis in

original).
1"4 For a discussion of furtum usus, see T. MOmmSEN, supra note 17, at 735
nn.2, 3. Comparing the common law of larceny with jurtum nec manifestum is
questionable, for the latter is a civil wrong, subject to the payment of double,
triple or sometimes quadruple damages. See notes 27, 35 supra.
155 4 W. BLACSTONE, supra note 12, at *232.
1 1

J.

ARCHBOLD, A SUMMXARY 0F THE LAW RELATING TO PLEADING AND Evi-

DENCE IN CRIAINAL CASES 119 (1822 ed.), relying on I M. HALE, supra note i2, at
509 (selling horse instead of returning it "is declarative of his first taking to be

felonious.")
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of the
The relevant act of returning or not is seen as evidence
1
intent at the time of the antecedent event of taking.' 7
Another issue that accreted to the nineteenth century preoccupation with intent was the phenomenon of taking under
color of right. As that doctrine developed in the common law
texts, the issue of color of right speaks to the problem of convicting someone whose taking is rendered ambiguous by a dispute
between the parties arising from objective circumstances, such as
"color of arrear of rent," 158 that would raise in the mind of a
third party observer a question of who had the better right to
possession. Hale insists on a "pretense of title," ','and the
examples he gives indicate concern about prosecuting someone
who takes goods "openly in the presence of the owner, or of other
persons that are known to the owner." 100 The doctrine was one
by the requirement of a manifestly criminal
readily implied
1
taking.

16

When nineteenth century writers begin to discuss the issue,
they gravitate to the phrase "claim of right" as an equivalent to
"color of right." 162 Though the earlier writers of the century,
like East, are careful to explain that by "claim of right" they
mean a "fair pretense of property or right in the prisoner," 103
the view slowly takes hold that any claim of right will prevent a
157 Focusing on the intent at the time of taking rather than the fact of the

subsequent return generated the possibility of acquitting someone who had not
in fact returned the thing taken. Several acquittals and reversals are recorded in
cases in which the defendant took a horse and later abandoned it. See, e.g., Rex
v. Crump, 171 Eng. Rep. 1357 (1825) (acquittal on charge of horse stealing);
Dove v. State, 37 Ark. 261 (i88i); 2 E. EAST, supra note 7o, at 662 (discussion of
Case of Phillips and Strong, apparently decided in ISoi); 2 W. RUSSELL, supra
note 134, at 1037 (discussion of Case of Phillips and Strong); cf. People v. Brown,
io5 Cal. 66, 38 P. 518 (894)
(defendant took bicycle in spat with playmate).
Yet as the case law developed, it became difficult for the defendant to avoid
conviction in cases of abandonment. See State v. David, 38 N.J.L. 176 (1875);
State v. Ward, 9 Nev. 297, 10 P. 133 (1886) ; cf. Rex v. Treibelcock, 7 Cox C.C.
408 (1858)
(convicting where defendant impermissibly took an object and
pawned it, allegedly with the intent to redeem and return it).
11s 4 W. BLACKSTONE supra note 12, at *232.
The doctrine appears not to
have been discussed by Coke and Hawkins.
159 1 M. HALE, supra note 12, at 5og.
160 Id.
161 Yet in Hale's analysis, id., it is fair to say that doctrine was thought of as
a basis for presuming an innocent intention, rather than a criterion of an
objectively criminal act. Hale continues: ". . . yet this may be but a trick to
colour a felony, and the ordinary discovery of a felonious intent is, if the party
doth it secretly, or being charged with the goods denies it." Id.
162 J. BIsHop, supra note 6o, at 474; H. RoscoE, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF
EvIoENcE IN CRIMINAL CASES 537 (2d American ed. 1840).
used in the Larceny Act 1916, 6 & 7 Geo., c. 50, § 1(I).
163 2 E. EAST, supra note 70, at 659.

This is the phrase
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conviction for larceny. Thus Chitty claims in 1816 that any
claim of right will do, "however unfounded." ' Later in the
century one finds Bishop summing up the doctrine as one that
would be available to the defendant "however puerile or mistaken

the claim may in fact be." "I Yet framing the issue as a "claim"
rather than "color" of right furthered the tendency to conceptualize the issues of larceny as subjective rather than objective.
It brought the issue into the same medium of analysis as East's
version of Pear,Archbold's theory of temporary takings, and the
emergent theory of liability by finders.
The Carrier's Case became a focal point in the process of
reinterpreting the common law tradition. So far as Blackstone
reflects the sentiment of his time, lawyers in the I76O's still found
the received interpretation of the case coherent and plausible. 6
This was no longer true in the early nineteenth century. Beginning primarily with East in 1803,167 one finds two new read-

ings of the case, both of which ignore the traditional understanding
that breaking bulk was important because at that moment, as
Blackstone put it, the "animus furandi is manifest." 16s One new
interpretation of the case was that breaking bulk "determined"
the bailment and thus caused the possession in the contents to
spring back to the bailor.' 6 9 This reading of the case reflected a
preference for mystifying "breaking bulk" and thinking of the
rule as an elaborate fiction. The theory that possession in the
contents sprang back to the bailor had little to do with the
traditional notions of determining the bailment according to the
terms of the original agreement.1 7 0 There was no longer an
1643
165 2

T. CnITTY, supra note 152, at 920.
J. BISHOP, supra note 6o, at 474. This formulation of the defense found

its way into the case law in People v. Hillhouse, 8o Mich. 580, 45 N.W. 484 (1890).
Compare the equally extreme, but stylistically different statements of the rule in
State v. Sawyer, 95 Conn. 34, iio A. 461 (192o) and People v. Eastman, 77 Cal.
171, 29 P. 266 (1888).
166 See note 68 supra.
167 2 E. EAST, supra note 7o, at 697.
1684 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *230.
6

' 9 See J. ARCHBOLD, supra note 156, at 124; 2 E. EAST, supra note 7o, at 697;
2 W. RUSSELL, supra note 134, at 2O93; First Report, supra note 4, at 7; accord,
Commonwealth v. James, i8 Mass. (I Pick.) 385 (1823); Regina v. Cornish, 169
Eng. Rep. 425 (1854). It was apparently East who devised this argument, supposedly on the authority of Hale's having argued that "the privity of contract is
determined by the act of breaking the package . . . ." 2 E. EAST, supra at 697. In
fact, Hale invoked the notion of possession's being "determined" exclusively to
explain the distinct rule emerging from The Carrier's Case that if the carrier
carries the bales "to the place, and delivers or lays them down . . . and then takes
the bales, he is guilty of larceny." I M. HALE, supra note 12, at 5o5.
170By the end of the eighteenth century, there were two types of case in
which the bailment was thought to be "determined." The first was by delivery
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effort to see the case as an expression of a plausible conception
of larceny. Treating the case as rooted in fiction was an important
phase in the process leading to skepticism about the rule of
breaking bulk and the eventual decision, in 1857, to extend
larceny to all conversions by bailees.'
More important for our present purposes was the simultaneous tendency to read The Carrier'sCase as a holding about
intent at the time of initially acquiring the bales.17 2 This view
derived from Kelyng's argument, antedating Blackstone, that
"breaking bulk" was significant only as evidence of the intent
at the time of receipt of the bales 173 rather than as a manifestation of thievery at the moment of breaking. Though this view
was ignored by Blackstone and later dismissed by Holmes as an
argument that can "hardly be accepted," 174 it reflected a view
of larceny whose time, in the early nineteenth century, had clearly
come. 1 7

The view, generally, was that the manifestation of

thievery or dishonesty should not be seen as a crime, but merely
as evidence of a crime occurring earlier at the time of initial
acquisition. The shift in emphasis from the later to earlier event
was the core of the systematic reinterpretation of the law of
to destination in accordance with the agreement. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 72, at *230; E. COxE, supra note 12, at *io8; I M. HALE, supra note X2, at
505. The second was by reading an express limitation on the duration of the bailec's
possession or the distance he was permitted to take the bailed object. The latter
category emerged in the early eighteenth century. The leading case is Tunnard's
Case, discussed at i68 Eng. Rep. 2o9, note (a). According to this note, Tunnard
was convicted in 1729 at Old Bailey. He borrowed a horse on the understanding
that he would ride to a point three miles distant. Instead he rode it up to London and sold it. The critical feature of the case was apparently the explicitly
contractual limitation. This second means of terminating a bailment, which permitted termination prior to delivery, encountered criticism. See Rex v. Banks,

i68 Eng. Rep. 887

(1821).

Vict., c. 54.
172 The primary advocates of this view were East and Russell. See

171 20 & 21

2

E. EAST,

supra note 7o, at 696-97; 2 W. RUSSELL, supra note 134, at 1093. Both acknowledged the difficulty that prompted other authorities to reject this view.
7
' See J. Kel. 82-83 (1789 ed.).
' Commonwealth v. Rubin, i65 Mass. 453, 455, 43 N.E. 200, 201 (i896).
For earlier rejections of Kelyng's argument, see State v. Fairclough, 29 Conn. 47
(i86o); First Report, supra note 4, at 7. The primary difficulty with Kelyng's
view, as history, is that it fails to explain why taking the entire bale did not
provide as much evidence of the antecedent intent as breaking it open and removing the contents.
17 To be fair to the early nineteenth century writers, one should see their
work not as history but as an effort to write a "more rational" law of larceny.
The inconsistency that prompted Holmes to reject Kelyng as bad history prompted
the reformers to urge the principle in the hope that the inconsistencies would be
eliminated.
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larceny. It affected the reading of Chisser 170 and Pear177 as
well as the interpretation of The Carrier's Case. Further, it
linked the newly cast law of finders with the reinterpretation of
the older cases. These connections become apparent in the following diagram:
Initial Acquisition

Manifestation
of Thievery or
Dishonesty

Carrier

laying hands on the bales

breaking open
the bales

Chisser

laying hands on the tie

bolting from
the store

Pear

mounting the horse

selling the
horse in Smithfield

Cases of
Finders

picking up the object

failing to take
adequate steps
to locate the
owner and
return object

"' The reported opinion in Chisser, 83 Eng. Rep. 142 (1678), suggests in
the second paragraph that Chisser's guilt was based on his supposed felonious
intent when he received the tie; it suggests in the third paragraph that the conviction rested on Chisser's failure to acquire possessorial immunity over the tie.
See note 78 supra. The rereading of the case turned on shifting attention from the
third paragraph to the second. East ascribed the latter reading of Chisser to the
judges in Pear's case. See 2 E. EAST, supra note 7o, at 687. For another opinion,
on similar facts, that similarly confused the issues of antecedent intent and the
objective sufficiency of the delivery, see King v. Sharpless, 168 Eng. Rep. 148
Chitty interprets the latter case as a conviction where a "pretended pur(772).
chaser absconds with [goods shown to him] and from the first, his intention was
to defraud. . . ." 3 T. CHiTTY, supra note 152, at 922; Cf. 2 W. RussELL, supra
note 134, at io69 (noting that in Sharpless both rationale were present).
177 The revisionist reading of Pear stemmed from East's report, published in
28o3, of the judges' opinion, see 2 E. EAST, supra note 7o, at 685-87, rather than
Leach's report, which was first published in 1789. Which of these reports is more
accurate is open to debate. For the division of authorities, see note 145 supra.
The bulk of authority supports the view that Pear should be read as a case about
larceny at the time of the subsequent conversion, not at the time of the initial
taking. Good nineteenth century authority for this view may be found in Regina
v. Brooks, 173 Eng. Rep. 5oi (x837), holding that the doctrine of Pear did not
apply in the absence of a conversion by the fraudulent bailee. The proponents
of the new view of larceny vehemently attacked Brooks. See 2 RussELL ON CRIMES
54 n.r (6th American from 3d London ed., C. Greaves, ed. i85o) (the editors
strenuously advance the view that intent at the time of receipt is the overriding
issue in cases of larceny by trick).
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It is clear that according to the traditional interpretation of
all these cases, the significant event occurred at the later time
although in every situation there might be some hint of a crime
at the moment of initial acquisition. What was merely a hint
prior to the end of the eighteenth century became the norm in
the early nineteenth. The view that prevails in East, Chitty, and
Russell is that all these crimes occur at the moment of initial
taking. By the time that His Majesty's Commissioners began
advocating a systematic view of the crime, older rules, like the
rule of "breaking bulk" had come to be seen as historical incrustations, to be discarded as soon as possible. Without yet
embracing these new theories, the courts had decided cases like
Pear, which called into question the traditional common law
concepts. By the middle of the century, with the support of a
body of critical literature, the courts were ready for a major
expansion of criminal liability.
B. The Criminalizationof Outwardly Innocent Takings
The move to integrate the problem of finders liability into
the law of larceny provided the first occasion for judicial reception of the new theory of liability. In Regina v. Thurborn 1,'
the defendant had come across a note that had been accidentally
dropped on the highway; he picked it up, allegedly with the
intent to keep it.1 ' At that time there was no indication who the
owner was or that the owner might be able to find it again.1 80
The following day, however, Thurborn was informed of the
owner's identity.' 8' Though he apparently believed this information, Thurborn changed and converted the note."8 2 The court
ruled on these facts Thurborn could not be guilty of larceny.'
What is interesting for our purposes is Baron Parke's analysis
of the question whether the initial taking of the note was larcenous. The gist of the problem, according to Baron Parke,
was to determine the circumstances as they appeared to the
prisoner at the time of the taking.'
The judge's statement of
178 169
79

1

181
18

Eng. Rep. 293 (1848).
Id. at 293.

Id.

1 Id.

1821Id.
183

Id.

The court saw two questions, whether Thurborn had committed lar-

ceny by picking the note up and whether he had committed larceny by converting
it subsequently, knowing who the owner was. The case is a leading one on the
basis of Baron Parke's treatment of the first question, which is analyzed in text.
However, Thurborn's acquittal depended on a negative answer to the second
question as well. Here the court held that, since Thurborn had lawfully obtained
possession,
he was protected by possessorial immunity. See id. at 297.
'4 Id. at 293.
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the rule that should govern finder's liability reflects the new
conception of larceny: ...
[I]f a man find[s] goods that have been actually lost, or are
reasonably supposed by him to have been lost, and appropriates
them, with intent to take the entire dominion over them, really
believing when he takes them, that the owner cannot be found,
it is not larceny. But if he takes them with the like intent,
though lost, or reasonably supposed to be lost, but reasonably
believing that the owner can be found, it is larceny.

Though Thurborn was not guilty under this rule, the case provided a theory for integrating the liability of finders in the law
of larceny. Although English judges initially responded skeptically to Baron Parke's dictum,' 86 his statement of the rule
guided subsequent litigation both in England 187 and the United
8
States.

18

The evolving law of finder's criminal liability provided a
precedent for thinking of outwardly innocent takings as criminal
if they should be accompanied by a prohibited state of mind.
Yet the problem of finders could be thought of as a separate
branch of the law, artificially engrafted onto the central trunk
of larceny. For the centrality of intent to displace the requirement of objective criminality in an ordinary case of stealing, one
had to await the outcome of a line of cases centering around the
liability of persons receiving goods by mistake. The critical case,
8 9
The Queen v. Middleton,"
decided in 1873, posed a paradig-

matic instance of outwardly innocent taking. The accused, one
Middleton, maintained a savings account at the post office; he
submitted an application to withdraw ten shillings from his
account. When he presented himself at the clerk's window for
payment, the clerk mistakenly remitted the wrong amount, overpaying the accused by about eight pounds. Middleton, obviously
knowing of the mistake, left the post office with the excess and
kept it. The case was more difficult than that of finding and
keeping, for 'here the clerk's handing the money to Middleton
bears all the earmarks of a delivery - a surrender of possession,
...Id. at

296 (emphasis added).

' See Queen v. Glyde, L.R. i Cr. Cas. Res. 139, 143-44 (1868)

(opinions of
Cockburn, C.J., and Blackburn, J., criticizing Thurborn as unsound); Regina v.
Deaves, ii CoX Com. Cas. 227, 230 (Ct. Crim. App. 1869).
187 The rule in Thurborn was eventually incorporated in the English Larceny
Act, 1916. Larceny Act 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 5o, § I(2)(i)(d) (finder takes
goods "where at the time of the finding the finder believes the owner can be
discovered by taking reasonable steps").
188See, e.g., State v. Levy, 23 Minn. 2o4, 2xo (1876) (citing Thurborn approvingly in a case where the defendant apparently saw the owner leave the goods
behind).
"8'The Queen v. Middleton, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 38 (1873).
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if not title; 190 and thus one is hard-pressed to see the case as a
felonious taking. Nonetheless, the court could have approached
the problem on analogy to Pear and reasoned that Middleton
acquired only custody over the excess payment and therefore
his subsequent conversion constituted a criminal taking.
Without adverting to the limited egress offered by Pear, the
judges of the time opted for a radical extension of the law of
larceny. 191 Eleven of the fifteen judges hearing the case concluded that Middleton was guilty of common law larceny. Their
reasoning was simply that Middleton took the surplus with the
intent to keep it and that was all that was required to convict of
larceny. °2
Justices Martin and, in particular, Bramwell sensed that there
was something fundamentally wrong about convicting for larceny
in the absence of a manifest act of thievery. Yet they had few
dootrinal gambits with which to mount an attack on the majority
view. They insisted, as did the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Topolewski, that larceny requires a "trespass" and not merely a
taking "I3and further that there could not be a trespass if the victim consented to delivery. 94 Yet these arguments meant little to
judges who failed to respond to Bramwell's claim that larceny
should be limited to a "privy (i.e., clandestine) or forcible taking." 1'5 That was the central issue and it was one that went
unnoticed by the majority of the judges, who saw little impediment, in policy or principle, to affixing criminal liability to
routine and unincriminating acts that became criminal only by
virtue of the actor's intent at the time. 90
190 The major dispute in the opinions was whether the post office clerk trans-

ferred title to the excess funds. Compare the opinion of Justice Brett, id. at
59-66 (arguing that there was a transfer of both title and possession), with that
of Justices Bovil and Keating, id. at 46-49 (contending that because the clerk
lacked authority to convey title to the authorized funds, there was no transfer).
11 For a harbinger of this extension, see Regina v. Mucklow, 168 Eng. Rep.
1225 (1827)
(recognizing the possibility of convicting in a case of acquisition
by mistake where there is animus furandi at the time of initial receipt).
' 92 L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. at 41, 48, 49 (1873).
at 53, 58 (Martin, J.)
19 Id.
"'The thrust of Bramwell's opinion was that the taking was not invito
domino - against the will of the owner. As in Topolewski, one finds an interweaving of the concepts of trespass and the absence of consent, see pp. 493-94
supra. Bramwell offers no account of why he favors a broad view of "consent"
-one
that would imply that the clerk "consented" because he "intended to do
the act he did." L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. at 55. It was not important to Bramwell
that the clerk made a mistake in intending to part with the money. Bramwell's
reasons include the claim that if the defendant "was led into temptation[,] the
" Id. at 56.
prosecutor
[i.e. victim] has very much himself to blame ...
" 5 L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. at 56.
190 Bramwell clearly realized the broader implications of rejecting the require-
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If Middleton was a landmark case in the growing influence
of the new theory of larceny, it was nonetheless a case that retained the requirement of a taking as an objective phenomenon.
Twelve years later in The Queen v. Ashwell 197 that requirement,
too, would come to be seen through the lens of a subjective
theory of larceny. In Ashwell the accused had borrowed a coin
from a compatriot; both initially thought that the coin was a
shilling while in fact it was a sovereign. Upon discovering the
mistake, Ashwell appropriated the coin. Even under the newer
cases -Pear,

Thurborn, and Middleton-the accused should

have been protected by the rule of possessorial immunity. He
had no felonious intent at the time of acquisition, and it was hard
to see why he did not acquire full legal possession over the coin.
Nonetheless, seven of the fourteen judges (enough to affirm the
conviction) held that Ashwell did not get possession until he
discovered the mistake and therefore, at that moment, "took"
the coin from the owner's possession.198 Some courts later reacted
against hitching the phenomenon of taking to the actor's subjective state. 9' But now that takings which to all appearances
were innocent could be punished, there seemed to be no good
reason for insisting that the "taking" be an objective rather than
a subjective phenomenon. From the perspective of a theory of
larceny based on subjective states, it seemed picayune to insist
that the felonious intent crystallized exactly at the moment that
the actor first touched the object he later stole. As a result, the
subjectification of '"taking" eventually prevailed in English
law."' Under the Theft Act of 1968, there seems to be little
dispute that someone doing what Ashwell did would be guilty of
ment of an objectively criminal act. He repeatedly refers to the case as one in
which "great and important principles are involved." Id. at 54; see id. at 59. He
obviously had in mind something of greater moment than the doctrines of passing
title and consent. In conclusion, he criticizes those who believe: "The prisoner
was as bad as a thief . . . and being as bad, ought to be treated as one .
Id. at 59.
197 16 Q.B.D. i9o (1885).
'See
id. at 203 (opinion of Cave, J.) ("Ashwell did not consent to the
possession of the sovereign until he knew that it was a sovereign."). But see id.
at 206 (Stephen, J., dissenting in a careful and scholarly opinion).
1OSee, e.g., Regina v. Hehir, 18 Cox Crim. Cas. 267 (1895); The Queen v.
Flowers, 16 Q.B.D. 643 (1886). Note that in cases of mistaken taking, the defendant might arguably be guilty of larceny as a bailee under 24 & 25 Vict., c. 96,
§ 3 (I861). In Ashwell this argument was rejected on the ground that a recipient
who does not take on the condition that he return the specific object is not a
bailee. i6 Q.B.D. at I99 (opinion of Smith, J.).
200See, e.g., Russell v. Smith, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 515; Rex v. Hudson, [1943]
i K.B. 458. The opinion in Hudson consists largely of a lengthy quotation from
the opinion by Cave, 3., in Ashwell. For a critique of the trend toward subjectivication of the concept of "taking," see Kerr, The Time of Criminal Intent in
Larceny, 66 LAw. Q. REv. 174 (1950) ; Scurlock, supra note 4, at 12.
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theft "by dishonestly appropriating" the property of another. 01
American courts adhered closely to the pattern of subjectification that occurred in England. At about the same time that
Middleton was decided, the New York Court of Appeals had
little difficulty reaching the same result on similar facts. °2
Though American courts have not followed the development
marked by Ashwell, °3 they have concurred since the end of the
nineteenth century that an outwardly innocent taking could be
felonious if the intent at the time was one prohibited by law.2 0 '
The metamorphosis of larceny began as a concrete expression
of the emerging theory of criminal law as a means for protecting
particular interests. It received its theoretical exposition in
the scholarly writing and judicial reformulations of the early
nineteenth century, and in the latter half of the century the new
conception of larceny became the orthodox mode of judicial
analysis. By 1916, the English Larceny Act, the first systematic
statement of the crime, could boldly declare that all of the
objectively neutral takings we have discussed - takings by trick,
mistake, finding - were larceny if accompanied by a felonious
intent."0 ' Though it survived in the crevice of staged larceny,
manifest criminality had clearly withered and died in the core
cases of the crime.
C. The Demise of Possession as a Relevant Boundary
The boundary represented by possession suffered an agonizingly slow demise. The rule of possessorial immunity received
a fatal blow in nineteenth century statutes penalizing conduct
that had previously been protected by the rule. Yet the significance of possession lived on as the organizing principle for
distinguishing larceny from the newer statutory offenses of
embezzlement and larceny by a bailee. °0 The final effort to bury
possession as a feature of larceny has come in our own time.
The impulse of Anglo-American legislative reform today is to
unify the offenses into one all-encompassing offense of theft by
20 See Theft Act i968, c. 6o, § 15(4).
2o Wolfstein v. People, 6 Hun 12X (N.Y. Gent. 2875).
203 See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 78 Tex. Crim. 79, i8o S.W. 115 (i9,5)

(holding

that there is no larceny if the recipient discovers the mistake after physically receiving a mistakenly drawn check); Cooper v. Commonwealth, i2o Ky. 123, 6o
S.W. 938 (i9OI). For American criticism of Ashwell, see W. CLARK & W. MARSuALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRimFs 849 & n.69 (7th ed. M. Barnes I967);
R. PERKINS, supra note i, at 216 n.91.
204

This is assumed by the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code. See notes 9,

IO Supra.
20' Larceny

Act i926, 6 & 7 Geo. 5,c. 50, § i(2)(i).

2o See note r supra.
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misappropriation." ° This newly defined offense represents a
final break with the ancient significance attached to breaking
another person's protected perimeter. ° s It relegates to history
the elements of entrustment and breach of trust that have been
distinguishing marks of embezzlement for nearly two centuries.
The total collapse of possession as a relevant boundary could
not have occurred without a conceptual reorientation of both
larceny and embezzlement. The metamorphosis of larceny shifted
the core of the crime from stealthful or forcible conduct to the
intentional acquisition of another's property. Embezzlement has
shifted over time from a crime thought of primarily as a breach
of trust 20 9 to a crime with the same core as larceny.2 10 If the
element perceived to be essential to both crimes is the dishonest
acquisition of the assets of another, there is no apparent reason
why the two should not be unified in one offense under one
standard of punishment.
This conceptual reorientation reflects the nineteenth century
preference for classifying all crimes as intrusions against specific
socially protected interests. Crimes were thought to be intrusions
against interests like life, personal security, governmental security, or property.2 11 Moral evils like the betrayal of a friend or
employer no longer seemed to be significant in assaying the
criminality of conduct.
The metamorphosis of larceny brought every item of property
into focus as an interest worthy of protection under the criminal
law. The loss of possessorial immunity meant that particular
relationships no longer stood in the way of protecting property.
The withering of objective criminality meant that the property
could be protected against every intentional acquisition. This
reorientation of the criminal law was not a response to the "felt
necessities of the time." 212 It was -a revolution in social thought
207 See note i supra.
208 For comments on the symbolic significance of perimeters and enclosures
in the ancient law of larceny, see note 37 supra.
209 See note 16 supra.
210 This thesis as it applies to the evolution of German law is developed bril-

liantly by H. MAYER, supra note 14, at 20.
2' This way of looking at the criminal law is well developed in 0. HoLrES,
THE COMMON LAW 70-75 (I881), which argued that punishable larceny was
merely an attempt to cause the ultimate harm of permanent deprivation of another's property, id. at 72, and in 2 J. Bisnop, supra note 60, at 472-73, which
argued in these words against the relevance of motives in defining larceny:
[It is immaterial to the person injured what species of base motive moved
the wrong-doer. And the wrong to society is the same, whatever the nature
of the baseness which prompted it.
The premise of this argument appears to be that criminal wrongs are measured
by the extent of actual deprivation.
212 0. HoLMESs, supra note 211, at i. For pitfalls of explaining legal change
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that shaped the nineteenth century sense for the range of prob-

lems that could appropriately be solved under the criminal law.
It was less a response to a problem than a determinant of our

sense for what the problem was.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. The Significance of the Metamorphosis
The metamorphosis of larceny illustrates a fundamental pattern in the historical development of Anglo-American criminal
law. The area that most clearly conforms to the larceny pattern
is the field of criminal attempts. 3 Although the crime of attempt
by appealing to social forces, see pp. 483-84 & note 64 supra (discussion of
scholarly readings of The Carrier's Case).
2. The overt act requirement in treason, though it reminds us of the principle
of manifest criminality, actually reflects a different concern. Treason, in at least
one of its branches, begins with the criminality of a state of mind: compassing
the death of the King. See Statute of Treason, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2 (1351). This state
of mind had to be made manifest by some overt act, however, see E. COKE,
supra note 4, at 3-8; I M. HALE, supra note 12, at iio, so that the critical issue
was what kind of act would be sufficient to make out the offense. At stake was
a fundamental libertarian concern; for the essence of the position taken by men
like Coke, Hale, and Foster, was that speech alone could not constitute "compassing the death of the King." See E. COKE, supra note 4, at 3-8; M. FOSTER,
A REPORT OF SO rE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE TRIAL OF THE
REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746 IN THE COUNTY OF SURREY AND OF OTHER CROWN CASES
200 (1762); I M. HALE, supra note 12, at iio.

The significance of the interpretation of the overt act requirement becomes
clear in the context of Crohagan's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 891 (1634). An Irish priest
had declared abroad, in great heat of speech, "I will kill the King, if I may come
upon him." The priest came to England two years later, allegedly to carry out his
design, and was apprehended and convicted of treason. For Hale the overt act
was Crohagan's coming to England. See I M. HALE, supra note 12, at Ix6.
Although this was concededly "an act indifferent in itself," id., the alternative
was to hold Crohagan's outburst sufficient alone to ground a conviction, and Hale
presumably wished to avoid such a result.
For the royalist Kelyng, in contrast, the coming to England was only important insofar as it tended to prove that Crohagan had had the prohibited state
of mind when he spoke; speech alone therefore could be a sufficient overt act for
treason. See 83 Eng. Rep. 2o59, J. Kel. 13. Kelyng, indeed, was prepared to
say that even approving silence could be treason, id. at 2O63-64, J. Kel. at 21:
the essential question was the state of mind betrayed by the defendant's behavior.
This merger of royalist sentiment and subjectivist criminal theory corresponds to
Kelyng's views on The Carries Case. See p. 512 supra.
Foster was highly critical of Kelyng's willingness to subject mere speech to
the accusation of treason and, in reaction, stressed the distinction between regarding an act as evidence of intent and treating it as a substantive element of
the offense. See M. FOSaR, supra, at 202-04. The latter position obviously resembles the principle of manifest criminality; it is, however, rooted in a different
and more fundamental concern.
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was first recognized in the eighteenth century, when the threads of
objective criminality were beginning to unravel, the history of the
law of attempts recapitulates the evolution we have observed in
the field of larceny. We shall briefly trace these developments
here, both as corroboration of our analysis of larceny and as an
illustration of its broader significance.
The effort to construct a crime of attempt has repeatedly encountered problems in establishing that the punishable event is
something more than criminal intent itself. Larceny at least retains an external element of harm: the deprivation of property.
Attempts, by definition, lack the element of harm, and consequently the external element of the crime, if any, must be found in
the act of attempting. This has led some theorists to insist that
the act of attempting is important for reasons that go beyond the
demonstration of firmness of resolve 2 14 or the corroboration of
an intent proven by extrinsic means.2 15
The quest for a substantive act of attempting led nineteenth
and early twentieth century theorists to rely upon objective criteria to account for the difference between a nonpunishable preparation and a punishable attempt.216 Salmond's efforts in this
direction incorporated a principle of objective criminality; his
view, which was the law of New Zealand for a time, was that the
act standing alone had to bespeak a criminal purpose.217 The
focus on the act as a distinct element also generated the theory of
impossible attempts that has so confounded the commentators.21
2 14

See note 217 infra.

2*

Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §

5.01(2)

(Proposed Official Draft

x962).

210 Holmes argued that the line between preparation and attempt should be

drawn with a view to "the nearness of the danger, the greatness of the harm, and
the degree of apprehension felt." 0. HOLMES, supra note 211, at 68; see Horn,
Der Versuch, 20 ZEITSCHRIF FUR DIE GESAM'TE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 309
(igoo). For a revival of these theoretical efforts in Germany, see Spendel, Zur
Neubegrundung der objektiven Versuchstheorie in FESTSCHRIFT FiR ULRICH STOCK
89 (1966).
217 The King v. Barker, [19243 N.Z.L.R. 865, 874 (Sup. Ct.) (Salmond, J.,
proposing that the threshold of attempts be satisfied only by overt acts which
are sufficient in themselves to proclaim the guilty purpose with which they are
done). The same theory is advanced in J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 404 (7th ed.
1924).
Cf. Campbell & Bradley v. Ward, [z9551 N.Z.L.R. 47, (Sup. Ct.) (act of
approaching parked car too equivocal to constitute attempted larceny). The rule
prevailed until abandoned by statute, Crimes Act, 196, § 72(3) (No. 43).
218 See generally J. HALL, supra note ri9, at 598-99; LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra
note I, at 443; G. WLrIAMrs, supra note ri9, at 635-37; 1 WORKING PAPERS OF
THE NAT'L Com'n
ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 36o-61
(1970);
Elkind, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts: A Theorist's Headache, 54 VA. L.
REV. 20 (1968); Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in
the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempts, Solicitation, and
Conspiracy, 61 CoLrum. L. REV. 571, 578-85 (ig6i). Enker presents a thoughtful
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Putting sugar in an intended victim's tea was not criminal, 21 0 but
putting in a non-lethal dosage of poison was.220 Shooting a tree
stump could not be criminal, whatever the intent; 221 but firing at
an intended victim's bed was, even though the intended victim was
not there at the time.22 2 Though there never was a crystallized
image of attempting akin to the shared image of the thief, the
principle of manifest criminality can help us understand these
efforts to conceptualize the act of attempting as an independent
and objective dimension of liability. The act itself had to bespeak
danger, as do the acts of putting poison in someone's coffee or
shooting at someone's bed. If the act itself did not signify danger,
if it was not a socially disturbing event, then the theory of manifest
criminality required that it be exempt from punishment.
The same factors that shape the modern law of larceny facilitated the emergence of intent as the core of the crime of attempting and the relegation of the act to one of many sources of evidence
of the required intent. Even if there had been an impulse to codify
the act as an independent, substantive element of attempting, the
issues might have proved too subtle for the legislative craft of
Anglo-American jurisdictions. So far as one can tell, there has
been no serious legislative effort to define the difference between
preparation and attempt and to codify the case law on impossible
attempts. Instead contemporary legislative revisions have gravitated toward the position of the Model Penal Code, that intent is
the central element of attempting; the act is important only so far
as it corroborates 223 or tends to prove the required intent. Though
some recent decisions have kept the doctrine of impossible attempts alive,22 4 contemporary Anglo-American legislative efforts
effort to defend the doctrine of impossibility in Enker, Impossibility in Criminal
Attempts -Legality
and the Legal Process, 53 Mn;i. L. REV. 665 (1969).
219 Cf. State v. Clarissa, ii Ala. 57 (847)
(defendant, a slave, tried to kill
her master with Jamestown weed; attempt conviction reversed on the ground that
there was no proof that Jamestown weed was a deadly poison).
0
" See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18 (1897).
21. O. HOL Es, supra note 2i1, at 69.
22 State v. Mitchell, 170 Mo. 633, 71 S.W. 175 (1902).
221 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)

(Proposed Official Draft

1962)

(requiring that

the actor's "substantial step" be strongly corroborative of his intent). Statutes
based on the Model Penal Code have abandoned the requirement of corroboration.
See, e.g., ILL. Am. STAT., ch. 38, § 8-4(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. I975); MINN. STAT.
ANNr. § 6o9.17 (1964); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1IO.OO (McKinney 1970). This legislative
pattern runs parallel to the thrust of the case law. See, e.g., United States v.
Brown, 3o5 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Tex. 1969) (defendant entered airport waiting
room with concealed gun; convicted of attempt to board aircraft illegally) ; People
v. Gibson, 94 Cal. App. 2d 468, 210 P.2d 747 (D.C.A. 1949) (defendant approached
building with ladder and sack of tools; court relied on his admission to affirm
conviction for burglary).
2124See Regina v. Smith, [1973] 2 All E.R. 896 (C.A.) (defense of impossi-
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typically have sought to resolve the issue by treating the circumstances as the defendant conceives them to be. 25 If the defendant
thinks that sugar is poison and puts it in an intended victim's tea

cup, his perception of the circumstances would be sufficient to render the act an attempt.
Like the parallel transformation of larceny, the subjectification
of attempts facilitates earlier intervention in criminal plans. There
is no need to wait until the act itself bespeaks criminality. 26 The
availability of this early intervention is particularly attractive as
against suspects whose intent can be readily inferred from prior
conduct and admissions. The criminality of intending finds support in the argument that the purpose of the criminal law is to

isolate dangerous persons and the best available index of dangerous propensities is someone's acting on a criminal intent.2

The criminality of intending has become so firmly entrenched
that legislatures now enact new crimes punishing acts innocent in
themselves like crossing a state line 228 or entering a building; 229
the essence of these new offenses is the intent to commit a criminal offense at the time of the "crossing" or "entering." The
coming center stage of intent is evident as well in a quiet drama
being played out in the law of false pretenses. This offense traditionally required that the actor induce the victim to transfer
property by a deception about the external world 230 - about,
bility recognized to charge of attempt to receive stolen property where property
has been returned to its owners prior to defendant's act); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973) (defense of impossibility recognized to charge
of sending letters in and out of prison "without the knowledge and consent of the
warden.").
225 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 8- (b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); MINN.
4
STAT. ANN. § 609.17, subd. 2 (1964); N.Y. PENAL LAW § iro.io (McKinney
1975) ; MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.ox(i) (a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). But note
that the new German criminal code, effective January i, 1975, retains the defense
of impossibility as a ground for mitigation of sentence. STGB § 23(3) (Lackner
1975).
226 The purpose of the revision proposed by the Model Penal Code is to avoid
decisions like People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334, x58 N.E. 888 (1927) (conduct of the
defendants, who rode around in car looking for bank messenger with undisputed
intent to rob him upon finding him, was held insufficient to constitute an attempt).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (a), Comment, at 49-50 (Tent. Draft No. io,
196o).
217 See Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 218, at 577.
22' For crimes committed by the act of travelling in interstate commerce, see
i8 U.S.C. § 1073 (1970) (with intent to avoid prosecution for specified crimes);
X8 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970) (with intent to incite a riot).
211 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 1 9A-2 (1969); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1991 (1970)
4
(entering train with intent to commit murder or robbery) ; 18 U.S.C. § 2276 (i97o)
(entering
any vessel with intent to commit any felony).
" 20 See Chaplin v. United States, 57 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Common-
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say, the defendant's credit status or the quality of goods offered
for sale. In the 1954 case of People v. Ashley,2 3' the California
Supreme Court boldly swept aside the requirement of an objective
misrepresentation and held that a misrepresentation about one's
intention could be a false pretense. That precedent has not garnered a following in other courts. But the trend of contemporary
legislation is to drop the traditional requirement of an objective,
documentable lie and embrace the potential punishability of routine business transactions. 32 It is now becoming the law in more
and more jurisdictions that borrowing money with the alleged intent not to repay can subject a3 3debtor to prosecutorial scrutiny
and potential criminal liability.

It might seem odd that an issue like intent could become so
prominent in the thinking of lawyers when it hardly lends itself to
ready application in concrete cases. There are few issues as inaccessible to proof as the actor's intent at the time he enters a
building or crosses a stafe line. Yet as compared with the concept
of objective criminality, the standard of intentionality offers a
singular advantage. The modern lawyer faces two difficulties in
comprehending the theory of objective criminality. He has difficulty in applying the standard - knowing precisely what counts
as "acting like a thief." Further, he might have doubts about the
coherence of a standard that so persistently eludes his grasp. After
all, what does the standard amount to if we can never be sure
about who is acting like a thief and who is not? The issue of intent is different. While we may never be sure about a person's unmanifested intent, we are not likely to question the standard
itself. Our own experiences of intending are sufficient to render
wealth v. Drew, 36 Mass. (1g Pick.) 179 (1837); Rex v. Goodhall, 168 Eng. Rep.
898 (1821).
23142 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271 (I954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900;
cf. Commonwealth v. Green, 326 Mass. 344, 348, 94 N.E.2d 260, 264 (1950) (defendant's
various unkept promises to use money collected to form an investment trust held
to be false "statements of fact as to the intention").
23 2
See MINN. STAT. § 609.52, subd. 2(3)(b) (,974); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
155.05(2)(d) (McKinney 1975); Crimes (Theft) Act 1973, No. 8425, § 81(4)
(Victoria, Australia) ; Theft Act i968, c. 60, § 15(4) (England & Wales) ; MODEL
PENAL CODE § 223.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
233 The court in Ashley thought that abuses would be prevented by the corroboration requirement in CAL. PENAL CODE § iiio (West 1970). See 42 Cal. 2d
at 259, 267 P.2d at 275. Yet the courts appear to be satisfied with corroboration of
the representation rather than of defendant's consciousness of its falsity, People v.
Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353 (1966) (false pretenses used as basis for
charge of felony murder; the false pretense was that defendant believed he could
cure cancer of the eye; no corroboration of his knowingly misrepresenting his
ability; conviction reversed on other grounds). But cf. People v. Randono, 32
Cal. App. 3d 164, io8 Cal. Rptr. 326 (I973) (alleged pretense was false promise
to pay for liquor; corroboration found in concealment of the liquor after delivery).
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the standard coherent even though in many cases we may not be
able to apply it to the conduct of others.
In addition to its intuitive plausibility, the standard of intent
has important political significance in generating a widely acceptable theory of criminal sanctions. Unlike the issues of harm and
objective criminality, the concept of intent appeals both to protectionists, whose central concern is identifying dangerous persons,
and retributivists, whose focus is punishing the blameworthy. Although some protectionists might prefer to go beyond the traditional forms of the criminal law in their quest to identify dangerous people,234 intent appears to be a better indicator of dangerousness than any other traditional element of criminal liability.3
More significantly, neither retributivists nor traditionalists have
seen a reason to criticize the ascendancy of intent, precisely because it seems so closely related to moral blameworthiness. As
the common denominator of contemporary theory, the concept of
criminal intent provides a foundation for the ideologically fragile
system of criminal justice to enjoy wide support.
B. The Perils of a Criminality of Intentions
In the total matrix of legal rules that we have today, the emphasis on intending as the core of criminal conduct raises a serious
paradox. In view of recent trends restricting the admissibility of
confessions, it seems odd to expand criminal liability to include
many instances of outwardly innocent conduct in which the suspect's confession of intent is the most desirable form of evidence.
When there is no close evidentiary link between the act and the
proscribed intent, the prosecution is forced to rely on the prospects
of securing a confession or testimony of the defendant's incriminating admissions. When these forms of evidence are unavailable, proof of the defendant's unmanifested intent is likely
to turn on even more questionable forms of evidence. If the issue
is crossing a state line with the intent to incite a political riot, the
accused's political associations become critical.2 3 6 If, as in Ashley,

the issue is intent to defraud, the prosecution's case is likely to be
24 A radical protectionist position might dispense with the requirements of

intent and culpability altogether. See B. WoorroN, CRIMr AND THE CRMINAL LAW
(1963), criticized in Hart, Book Review, 74 YALE L.J. 3325, 1329-31 (1965);
Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMB. L.J. 273, 285-90 (1968). Another
line of protectionist thought would be to eliminate the requirement of an act as
well as intent and to rely exclusively on predictive indices, thus merging the
criminal law with the institution of civil commitment.
25 See Wechsler, Jones & Kom, supra note 238, at 577.
2. Witness the trial and conviction of five of the "Chicago Seven." See United
States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1973).

3972)

(reversing for procedural abuses),
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enhanced by evidence of extrinsic acts of untoward behavior
toward the victims, such as the testimony in Ashley that the defendant threatened one of the victims with a gun 237 and haggled
with the other close to "the edge of a sheer slope." 238 This kind
of evidence arguably should not be admitted, but when it does
pass the test of relevance, it invariably influences the jury in
assessing whether the defendant is the type of person who would
have acted with the prohibited intent.
While the substantive law encourages the use of confessions
and character evidence, the law of evidence discourages it. One
way to resolve this apparent paradox is to see the law of evidence
as performing tasks once performed by the substantive rules. If
the principle of objective criminality formerly inhibited efforts to
infer criminality from confessions and from character evidence,
that value must now be realized in working out the rules of
admissibility at trial.
There are two serious shortcomings in relying on the law of
evidence as a surrogate for substantive rules. First, rules restricting the admissibility of evidence are notoriously subject to technical circumvention. Virtually anything comes in by way of
impeaching the defendant's testimony; 23 and if the defendant refuses to testify, a catalog of other exceptions comes to play.2 40
A more significant reason why the law of evidence cannot provide a substitute for substantive rules is that the inadmissibility
of incriminating evidence does not inhibit police and prosecutorial
investigation. If the law requires a manifestly incriminating act,
and there is none in fact, no amount of investigation and interrogation can generate a functional equivalent. Yet if outwardly
innocent conduct can constitute larceny or false pretenses, the
police and prosecutorial staff face a far wider range of cases in
which effective investigation and interrogation might yield sufficient evidence to convict. In the field of false pretenses, for example, the pool of potential suspects encompasses everyone who
receives property in return for a promise and later defaults on the
237 42 Cal. 2d at 256, 267 P.2d at 278.
2 8
3 Id. at 254, 267 P.2d at 277.
239 See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (0971) (confessions obtained

in violation of Miranda admissible for purposes of impeachment) ; State v. Ternan,
32 Wash. 2d 584, 203 P.2d 342 (1949)
(evidence of defendant's reputation for
dishonesty admissible to impeach his testimony); CAL. EvID. CODE § 788 (West
1966) (prior felony convictions admissible to impeach defendant's testimony).
24
°See, e.g., State v. Schut, 71 Wash. 2d 400, 429 P.2d 126 (1967) (prior acts of
incest admissible to show "lustful inclination" toward daughter in incest prosecution); State v. Yoshino, 45 Hawaii 2o6, 364 P.2d 638 (196i) (subsequent robbery
admissible to prove "continuous plan or scheme"); CAL. EviD. CODE § zioi(b)
(West 1966) (listing exceptions). See generally MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EvIDENC E § i9o, at 448-5i (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) (documenting ten
exceptions).
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promise. To direct their resources within a pool of this scope,
police and prosecutors must rely on the subsidiary criteria of
suspected dangerousness to the community. In making these judgments of projected dangerousness, factors of reputations, ethnicity, and class probably matter more than we should like to admit.
Thus we see that the emergence of intention as the core of criminality is linked with the progressive legitimation of prosecutorial
discretion and the shift in emphasis in the criminal process from
assessing acts at trial to assessing actors prior to trial.
In the idiom of evidence, the principle of objective criminality
holds that an incriminating act is an indispensable form of evidence
in the proof of criminal intent. Unlike other items of evidence,
incriminating conduct is not fungible with other offers of proof
tending to prove the same ultimate fact. The significance of a
form of evidence that is necessary to establish guilt is that its
absence is sufficient to assure an acquittal. Thus the principle of
objective criminality protects suspects against prosecutorial inquiry by providing a rule sufficient to establish innocence under
the law. The same rule of sufficiency protects suspects against
judicial inquiry into their character, states of mind, and private
feelings of guilt. According to the principle of objective criminality, no one is subject to investigation, accusation, or conviction
unless his conduct meets a threshold of publicly incriminating
acts.
C. Reviving Objective Criminality
If the principle of objective criminality guarantees privacy
from intrusive inquiries into character and other personal matters,24 1 then we might be tempted to advocate its revival. The
value of privacy speaks to us in compelling tones. Privacy in its
many forms has become a central value in both constitutional2 42
241

The protection of privacy by the principle of objective criminality was the
HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHI-

"result of human action, but not of human design." F.

LOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 96-105 (1967); it was a consequence of a

system premised on public and visible incidents of criminal conduct. If we recall
the origins of objective criminality in the private right to execute manifest thieves,
we find that the principle is rooted in the self-interest of property owners fearful
of the community's misinterpreting the slaying of a suspected thief. If the slayer
was not to be regarded as a criminal himself, he had to rely on unambiguous
signs of the slain man's criminality.
As the private right to execute thieves became domesticated in the courts, it
generated a principle of legality, that the courts should observe the same restraints
that had disciplined the use of force by private citizens. Even though not grounded
in the self-interest of judges and prosecutors, this principle survived until the
metamorphosis as a form of institutional discipline, assuring that criminal convictions would be based upon publicly incriminating facts.
24 2 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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and tort 243 theory, and we may still readily concur with Holmes
in suspecting legal rules that focus on the hearts and minds of
individual citizens.2 44 We have good reason to feel uneasy about
enthroning intent as the core of criminality and inferring intent
from confessions and character evidence. If privacy does command our loyalty, then we should consider returning to the pattern
of the common law that prevailed prior to the metamorphosis of
larceny.
Is it too late to think about reversing the historical trend and
stimulating a counter-metamorphosis of larceny and other offenses? Possessorial immunity may be rent beyond recall, but the
principle of objective criminality still weaves its way through the
cases of staged larceny and impossible attempts. A deliberate revival of objective criminality would lead to the decriminalization
of conduct that is objectively neutral and unincriminating. Acquisition by the mistake of another would be subject at most to
civil remedies. The Ashley rule would be reversed: obtaining
property by false pretences would require an objectively incriminating misrepresentation. An extreme counter-metamorphosis
could take us back to the state of the law in the late eighteenth
century, prior to Pearand the first general embezzlement statute.
Yet many of these late eighteenth century developments could be
brought into harmony with the principle of objective criminality.
Pear could easily be solved, as it would be under German law, by
a more flexible view of the elements of obtaining property by false
pretenses.2 4 5 There is no compelling reason why obtaining use of
the horse should not be treated as the acquisition of a sufficient
property interest.246 Many cases of embezzlement could also
satisfy the test of objective criminality; the doctrinal problem
would be shifting the standard of conversion from the issue of
harm to the characteristic instances of embezzling as a form of
behavior.247
Though much of the current law could be salvaged under the
principle of objective criminality, there is no doubt that its revival
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246 Cf. Theft Act 1968, c. 6o, § 15(2) (liberalizing the common law definition
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...
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247 The tendency in German law is to treat the act of conversion as a form
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would lead to substantial decriminalization of dishonest acquisitions. The decriminalization to which we might be led by a counter-metamorphosis, however, would leave other sanctions in its
wake: The principle of objective criminality requires only that the
criminal law withdraw from the field, not that all sanctions should
be removed from dishonest but objectively unincriminating conduct.
There is nevertheless a theoretical objection to reviving the
principle of objective criminality that, in the context of this paper,
is more telling than the practical difficulties. The argument would
be that the standard of looking-like-a-thief deviates too much
from the contemporary style of legal thought to warrant serious
consideration. Some judges may talk about knowing obscenity
when they see it,24 but we would hardly want them to convict a
thief by seeing one in a set of reconstructed facts. The standards
of objective criminality are appealing substantive guides, but they
come clothed in a style of reasoning that we now find too difficult
to accept.2 49 This is -the tension in modern legal thought between
historic substantive principles and contemporary styles of rhetoric.
Yet -this tension might not be insuperable. One can distinguish
between solving particular cases and formulating general rules. So
far as we look at the solving of particular cases, it does seem implausible to expect judges to reason from a standard of lookinglike-a-thief. Yet if we focus instead on formulating rules, which in
turn are grounded in the principle of objective criminality, we
might be able to translate the values behind the principle into administrable judicial standards. If 'the historical account of this
paper is correct, it appears that the courts in fact responded to
the principle of objective criminality in working out the substantive rules of breaking bulk, the contours of possession, and the
doctrines of consent .and delivery in cases of staged larceny. An
analogous standard is at work in the cases on impossibility as a
defense in attempt prosecutions. Admittedly, rules of this sort
require finer distinctions that those geared to the concept of
criminal intent. Their interpretation and application tend toward
a formal style of legal reasoning that is readily criticized as unresponsive to policy considerations. What one has to see in order
to vindicate rules based on the principle of objective criminality
is that -the rules themselves respond to an important value, even
though application of the rules in particular cases might appear
to be formalistic.
248 See Jacobellis v, Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
240 The difficulty here runs parallel to the problem, discussed in an earlier

paper, of applying the standard of nonreciprocal risktaking in resolving concrete
disputes in tort. See Fletcher, supra note 24, at 571-73.
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For our purposes, the point of studying the history of larceny
has not so much been to urge a reversal of this historical trend, but
rather to discover and elaborate substantive values in the history
of larceny. We may decide in the end to reject the values implicit
in our tradition, but that is a decision we should make with a sense
of the richness and the sophistication of legal practices all too
often scorned or ignored. If there is much to be learned in formulating policies for the future, there is also much to be learned from
the tradition that made us what we are.

